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Data Management Law for the 2020s: 
The Lost Origins and the New Needs 
PRZEMYSŁAW PAŁKA† 
In the data analytics society, each individual’s disclosure of 
personal information imposes costs on others. This disclosure 
enables companies, deploying novel forms of data analytics, to infer 
new knowledge about other people and to use this knowledge to 
engage in potentially harmful activities. These harms go beyond 
privacy and include difficult to detect price discrimination, 
preference manipulation, and even social exclusion. Currently 
existing, individual-focused, data protection regimes leave law 
unable to account for these social costs or to manage them.  
This Article suggests a way out, by proposing to re-conceptualize 
the problem of social costs of data analytics through the new frame 
of “data management law.” It offers a critical comparison of the two 
existing models of data governance: the American “notice and 
choice” approach and the European “personal data protection” 
regime (currently expressed in the General Data Protection 
Regulation). Tracing their origin to a single report issued in 1973, 
the Article demonstrates how they developed differently under the 
influence of different ideologies (market-centered liberalism, and 
human rights, respectively). It also shows how both ultimately 
failed at addressing the challenges outlined already forty-five years 
ago. 
To tackle these challenges, this Article argues for three 
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normative shifts. First, it proposes to go beyond “privacy” and 
towards “social costs of data management” as the framework for 
conceptualizing and mitigating negative effects of corporations’ 
data usage. Second, it argues to go beyond the individual interests, 
to account for collective ones, and to replace contracts with 
regulation as the means of creating norms governing data 
management. Third, it argues that the nature of the decisions about 
these norms is political, and so political means, in place of 
technocratic solutions, need to be employed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the data analytics society,1 a person who allows a 
company to collect data about herself enables that company 
to indirectly learn things about other people.2 Some of this 
inferred knowledge might pertain to private matters, which 
the other prefers to keep unknown. However, even 
knowledge inferred about non-private matters, which people 
might freely disclose, can be costly when captured in the vast 
databases of online companies. Non-private information can 
be used to engage in fine-tuned price discrimination,3 to 
harness behavioral effects like preference manipulation4 or 
addiction,5 or to sustain social segmentation, subordination, 
and even exclusion.6 These costs, conceptually distinct from 
the problem of “privacy,”7 are unaccounted for by 
contemporary privacy law, in particular the “notice and 
choice” model governing consumer data collection and 
usage.8 When I allow others to collect data about me, I 
 
 1. By “data analytics society,” I mean the socio-technological reality where a 
significant number of individuals’ daily activities is mediated by technology, 
recorded in tech companies’ databases, and analyzed in order to refine the 
environment, including via personalized communications. See infra Section II.A. 
 2. See infra Section II.A.  
 3. See Oren Bar-Gill, Algorithmic Price Discrimination: When Demand Is a 
Function of Both Preferences and (Mis)perceptions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 254 
(2019). 
 4. See Eliza Mik, The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer 
Transactions, 8 L., INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 1 (2016); see also infra Section II.B. 
 5. See Jack Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 4 (Hoover Working 
Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech., & Law, Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018) (“The more 
digital companies know about people’s emotional vulnerabilities and 
predispositions, the more easily they can structure individual end-user 
experience to addict end users to the site”); see also infra Section II.B. 
 6. See Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, QUEUE, 
Mar. 2013, at 10-16, https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2460278; see also 
Muhammad Ali et al., Discrimination through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad 
Delivery Can Lead to Skewed Outcomes, PROG. ACM HUM.-COMPUTER 
INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, at 2–4, https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3359301. 
 7. See infra Section II.C. 
 8. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
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impose various costs on you and our fellow humans. My 
consent, even well-informed, cannot justify the costs imposed 
on others. 
This state of affairs is caused both by the changes in 
socio-technological practice and by the law. Widespread 
usage of internet-connected smart devices allows service 
providers to continuously collect data about millions of 
people.9 Data analytics techniques, like machine learning, 
enable companies to detect patterns in the enormous 
databases and to infer new knowledge from them.10 People’s 
reliance on online communications makes it possible for 
companies to act upon that knowledge through automated, 
personalized communications.11 As a result, the music you 
listen to on Spotify can reveal your race,12 and influence what 
job advertisements you will receive through Google Ads.13 
The type of food you order on Uber Eats can reveal your 
political convictions14 and be used to encourage or discourage 
you from voting through the content you see on Facebook.15 
Whose posts you like on Twitter can help reveal how rich you 
are16 and enable online sellers to price-discriminate against 
 
785–918 (2018); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); see also infra Section 
III.A. 
 9. See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 9–10 (2016). 
 10. Id. at 10–19. 
 11. Id. at 125–39. 
 12. Shantal R. Marshall & Laura P. Naumann, What’s Your Favorite Music? 
Music Preferences Cue Racial Identity, 76 J. RES. PERSONALITY 74, 74 (2018). 
 13. For the empirical evidence of racial discrimination in online ad-delivery, 
see Sweeney, supra note 6. 
 14. See Daniel DellaPosta et al., Why Do Liberals Drink Lattes?, 120 AM. J. 
SOC. 1473, 1474–75 (2015). 
 15. See Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone 
Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/ 
117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering.  
 16. See Yannick Leo et al., Socioeconomic Correlations and Stratification in 
Social-Communication Networks, 13 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 1, 1 (2016). 
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you.17 All these things are possible not because you directly 
disclose information about your race, political convictions, 
and wealth. Rather, the bits and pieces you disclose, 
analyzed in the context of data about millions of others, allow 
the data holders to infer these facts about you.18 
Law plays a significant, even if background, role in the 
creation of this world. Technology, and the way people use it, 
renders the practices described above factually possible; but 
it is the law that deems them normatively permissible. As of 
today, companies derive their rights to collect, analyze, and 
use the personal data from the individual users’ “choices” or 
“consents.”19 In their “privacy policies,” online service 
providers inform us what they plan to do with the data they 
collect, and we grant them to a right to do so. However, it is 
by no means obvious that it should be up to the individual to 
make these decisions or grant these permissions. Not only 
the consequences of accepting a policy are often unknown to 
the users,20 but also the effects of the data-driven actions 
might affect people who are not even parties to the 
agreement that accepting the privacy policy creates.  
For these reasons, an individual consumer is neither 
cognitively capable nor normatively competent to “agree” to 
data collection and usage that will affect not only her but also 
other individuals and indeed society as a whole. And yet, the 
currently dominant “notice and choice” paradigm of 
American consumer privacy law is based precisely on the 
paradigm of individual consent.21 With a few exceptions, no 
 
 17. Ramsi A. Woodcock, Big Data, Price Discrimination, and Antitrust, 68 
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1386–87 (2017). 
 18. To be clear, this is not “knowledge” in the philosophical sense, but rather 
what Ethem Alpaydin calls “a good and useful approximation.” ALPAYDIN, supra 
note 9, at 13. 
 19. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 592. 
 20. Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: 
Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking 
Services, 21 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 128, 143 (2018). 
 21. See infra Section III.A. 
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federal rules setting absolute substantive limits on the types 
of usage of personal data exist.22  By refraining from stepping 
in, the law creates certain markets and incentives to 
construct business models around obtaining consent to 
effectively unrestricted data collection, analysis, and 
usage.23 
This Article proposes to address the problem of social 
costs of data gathering, analysis and usage within a new 
legal frame: “data management law.” This proposed 
reconceptualization aims to create a new legal field and 
includes not just a call to enact new rules but also to 
reconsider existing rules within a different paradigm. “Data 
management law” would encompass both the existing and 
the future norms stipulating who is entitled to do what with 
which personal information and under what conditions. For 
this paradigm shift to occur, the law must reform along three 
dimensions.  
First, the legal community needs to go beyond “privacy” 
when pondering harms of data analytics, and move towards 
a more inclusive category of “social costs of data 
management.”24 Various types of data-driven social costs 
exist; many of them have little to do with disclosure of 
personal data. For example, data-driven price 
discrimination, preference manipulation, or social 
segmentation can hurt individuals that remain anonymous 
from the point of view of the company conducting such 
actions.25 As a result, the privacy protections applying to 
 
 22. See infra Section I.C. 
 23. See Julie E. Cohen, Between Truth and Power, in INFORMATION, FREEDOM 
AND PROPERTY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Bibi van den Berg eds., 2016); see also JULIE. E. COHEN, 
BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL 
CAPITALISM (2019). 
 24. For the explanation of the concept of a social cost, see Ronald H. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 837 (1960).  
 25. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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“identified or identifiable”26  persons might not be triggered 
in situations most harmful to society and individuals. Not 
everything done with personal data should be governed 
solely by privacy laws. 
Second, we need to go beyond the individual interests 
and account also for the collective ones. Matters like non-
discrimination, the integrity of the political process, or 
mental health, should not be the domain of individual 
preferences. They are of interest to the society as a whole. In 
the data analytics society, they are endangered. Instead of 
relying on individual consumers to consult the privacy 
policies, and to decide whether they accept the rules or not, 
we need public-oriented disclosures (“societal notice”) and 
collectively taken decisions (“societal choices”). This will 
mean separating the fact-conferring function currently 
played by corporations’ privacy policies from the norm-
creating one and supplementing contracts with regulation.27 
Third, the policy-makers need to abandon the 
technocratic normative standards and replace them with 
politics. The rules governing data management should not 
come from the market,28 as they currently do in the US, or be 
derived from general principles like human rights29 or 
“fiduciary duties.”30 Rather, they should be decided through 
public deliberations, based on reliable knowledge (coming 
from societal notices) and considering various interests at 
 
 26. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 
1818–19 (2011). 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. For the proposal of managing external effects of data analytics using 
economic solutions, like the “Pigouvian taxes,” see Omri Ben-Shahar, Data 
Pollution (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 854, 2018). 
 29. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 30. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1233 (2016). But see Lina Khan & David Pozen, A 
Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 509–10 (2019). 
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stake. These decisions, given the enormous variety of uses of 
personal data, and the heterogeneity of risks imposed by 
them, should not come in the form of “one-size-fits-all” 
regulation, as they currently do both in the US and the EU. 
Rather, they should occur on a sectoral, issue-by-issue 
basis.31 
My argument is based on the lessons learned from the 
critical analysis of the development of the “data management 
law” in the United States, and its comparison with the 
alternative approach adopted by the European Union, 
currently expressed in the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation.32 I provide a new history of both legal regimes 
seen together, tracing the origins of both models to a single 
document, namely the 1973 Report of the U.S. Health, 
Education and Welfare Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems titled Records, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens.33 Its influence on the 
American law is acknowledged,34 though as I show, often 
misunderstood. Regarding the European system, this article 
nuances the self-understanding of European data protection 
lawyers by demonstrating how the GDPR’s regulatory 
framework can be traced back to a document issued by 
Americans for the American administration.35 
 
 31. See infra Section IV.C. 
 32. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS COMPUTERS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973) [hereinafter 1973 REPORT]. 
 34. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP 
IT 201 (2008); SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 36; Marc Rotenberg, Fair 
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 
2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13–17, 15 n.74. 
 35. See infra Section I.C. 
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This document turns out to have been not only 
influential but also prescient. I show that, already in the 
early 1970s, certain problems we tend to treat as new were 
foreseen. These include the ease of combining data from 
different sources and using it for unintended purposes, 
organizations’ ability to use this data to influence the 
behavior of individuals, the possibility of masking policy-
decisions as technical ones, and the risk of imposing the costs 
on the most vulnerable members of the society.36 The report’s 
authors foresaw the need to closely monitor technological 
developments, and to take regulatory decisions regarding the 
limits of automated data analytics.37 The recommendations 
they put forward called for legislative intervention, enabling 
public oversight over the organizations’ data practices. The 
proposed legislation, based on three pillars: general 
principles, public-oriented disclosure, and data subjects’ 
rights; was supposed to facilitate political deliberations 
about the acceptable frames for data management.38 
However, neither the American nor the European data 
management frameworks managed to fulfill the tasks the 
report set forth. Today, we suffer the consequences of these 
failures. 
I trace how the existing American approach has been 
developed within the 1990s mindset favoring the markets, 
self-regulation and individual choice, thereby ignoring the 
questions of externalities, and opposing regulation. The 
European model, on the other hand, was forged largely by 
human rights lawyers, first and foremost concentrating on 
keeping the state power in check, thereby ignoring the 
reality of market operations. On the surface, the two regimes 
seem distinct.39 The American law is sectorial, market-
 
 36. See infra Section I.A. 
 37. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 12–30. 
 38. Id. at 48–71. 
 39. For the comparisons of both systems, see Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in 
Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 
42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2019); Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus 
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oriented and based on self-regulation, while the European is 
general,40 rooted in the human rights logic, and enshrined in 
legislation. However, they both commit the same mistakes: 
frame the costs of data management solely as the problems 
of privacy (or personal data “protection”), concentrate only on 
the individual interests, and employ technocratic means of 
dealing with these costs (market solutions, and human 
rights, respectively). Both the American and European law 
forgot the insights provided already forty-five years ago. This 
Article serves not only as a reminder, but also updates the 
recommendations, to make them directly useful for the socio-
technological reality of the 2020s. 
The Article consists of four parts. Part I analyzes the 
1973 Report in detail, paying attention to the types of risks 
that its authors noticed 45 years ago, as well as the exact 
recommendations they made. Part II fast-forwards to 2020, 
and focuses on the features of today’s data analytics society, 
explaining how three phenomena: (i) seamless data 
collection; (ii) inferred knowledge; and (iii) automated 
decision making further facilitate practices in which 
companies impose costs on individuals and the society as a 
whole. I study three examples of such data-driven, costly 
behavior: price discrimination, behavior manipulation, and 
societal segmentation. Part III analyzes how these practices 
are sanctioned by law. It describes the American “notice and 
choice” and European “data protection” models of data 
management law, tracing their historical and ideological 
origins, and pointing out their shortcomings regarding the 
management of social costs of data analytics. Part IV draws 
lessons from these reconstructions and proposes a way of 
thinking about “data management law” for the 2020s. It 
argues for: i) moving beyond “privacy” law and towards a 
more inclusive category of “social costs of data management”; 
ii) accounting for collective interests in addition to individual 
 
Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 180 (2017). 
 40. Sometimes called “omnibus.” See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 
1141. 
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ones; and iii) replacing technocratic means of decision-
making with politics. Conclusions follow. 
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I. THE ORIGINS. OR, HOW THE AMERICANS  
“INVENTED” THE GDPR IN 1973 
On June 25, 1973, Willis H. Ware sent a letter to a 
Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Health, Education 
and Welfare in the Nixon administration. Ware, a pioneer in 
the fields of computing and computer security,41 served as a 
chairman of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems. The Committee had 
been formed to analyze the “harmful consequences that may 
result from using automated personal data systems.”42 In the 
early 70s public and private organizations were rapidly 
adopting computers as a technology allowing for more 
efficient storage and processing of records about people. In 
the midst of the Cold War and the Space Race, the citizens 
voiced numerous fears connected with this phenomenon, and 
the Government decided to investigate.43  
The Committee, comprised of twenty-five members, 
including lawyers and engineers, as well as social workers, 
managers, state legislators, private citizens, and a labor 
union official met nine times between April 1972 and March 
1973.44 It heard testimony from more than 100 witnesses, 
consulted similar groups from Canada, Great Britain, and 
Sweden, and contacted about 250 trade and professional 
associations and public interest groups to gather 
information. The result of its work, which Ware attached to 
his letter to Weinberger, was a 300-page long report, titled 
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens. 
This report would prove immensely consequential in the 
decades to come. It has influenced, though in different, 
 
 41. Michael Rich, Eulogy for Willis Ware, RAND (Mar. 28, 2014), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP700/CP775/RA
ND_CP775.pdf.  
 42. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at ix.  
 43. See ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY 
465-86 (1972); see also Solove & Schwartz, supra note 8, at 36. 
 44. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 147–59. 
2020] DATA MANAGEMENT LAW 573 
unobvious, and today sometimes forgotten ways, both 
American data management law45 and its European 
counterpart.46 The vocabulary it used, concepts it coined, and 
axiology it proposed continue to shape the laws of today. 
However, as I argue in this Article, both the American and 
the European data management frameworks did not meet 
the report’s challenges. Instead, each regime has been 
distorted in various ways and failed to follow-through on 
certain foundational tasks. To understand how and why, let 
us first take a closer look at this magnificent document. 
A. The Rise of the Machine and the Mindset Forty-Five 
Years Ago 
The Report’s authors stated in the Foreword: 
It is important to be aware, as we embrace this new technology, that 
the computer, like the automobile, the skyscraper, and the jet 
airplane, may have some consequences for American society that 
we would prefer not to have thrust upon us without warning. Not 
the least of these is the danger that some recordkeeping 
applications of computers will appear in retrospect to have been 
oversimplified solutions to complex problems, and that their victims 
will be some of our most disadvantaged citizens.47 
Today’s debates about fairness of algorithmic practices 
regarding policing,48 creditworthiness,49 teacher’s 
assessments,50 or hiring51 render these predictions, made in 
 
 45. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 46. See infra Section III.B. 
 47. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at v–vi. 
 48. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: 
Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15 (2016); 
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 
(2017). 
 49. See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big 
Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 148, 157 (2016). 
 50. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 3–6 (2016). 
 51. See McKenzie Raub, Bots, Bias and Big Data: Artificial Intelligence, 
Algorithmic Bias and Disparate Impact Liability in Hiring Practices, 71 ARK. L. 
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the early 1970s, sadly correct. Various “algorithmic tools” put 
to work with the aim of optimizing assessment processes 
indeed oversimplify the world, and the victims of these 
oversimplifications are disproportionately women and racial 
minorities.52 Moreover, ironically, in retrospect, we see that 
the legal frameworks developed as responses to the 
emergence of computing were in themselves simplified 
solutions to the complex social problems. The authors begin 
by situating the development of computers in a wider social 
and historical context, then explain what new capacities 
result from their introduction, highlight the risks associated 
with these changes, and gradually move to their own policy 
proposals. Let us briefly look at each of these.  
Three consequences of computers’ introduction and 
widespread adoptions attracted the authors’ attention: (i) 
substantial enlargement of organizations’ data processing 
capacities; (ii) easy access to data within the organization 
and across firm boundaries; and (iii) emergence of a “new 
class of record keepers.”53 Each of these changes, inherent in 
the process of computerization, can be beneficial for an 
organization and its clients, but also comes with its own 
“latent effects.”54 
First, increased data processing capacity might lead to 
“too much data” to process. Data overload could force 
organizations to try to simplify the world, by creating various 
categories ex ante and forcing individuals to “fit [themselves] 
into” these categories while filling in the forms and providing 
information.55 Second, “easy access” to information within 
and across the organizations might lead to combining of 
information from various sources, gathered for different 
 
REV. 529 (2018). 
 52. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for 
Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67 (2017). 
 53. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 12. 
 54. Id. at 12–30. 
 55. Id. at 14. 
2020] DATA MANAGEMENT LAW 575 
purposes, into single individual dossiers. As a result, 
“neither the data subject nor the new holder knows what 
purpose the data may someday serve.”56 Third, entrusting 
more and more data processing into hands of engineers and 
system developers might lead to a situation where “questions 
of record-keeping practice which involve issues of social 
policy are sometimes treated as if they were nothing more 
than questions of efficient technique.”57 
These three developments are particularly problematic, 
in the view of the Report’s authors, when the organizations’ 
purpose is not only to predict, but also to “coerce” (or, as we 
would say nowadays, when such practices became 
normalized, “influence” or “nudge”)58 some types of behavior. 
They write:  
[W]ords like “control” and “coercion” may have an objectionable 
ring, but the coercive potential of the surveillance component, 
especially in some other area of application, is evident.59  
The authors of the 1973 report were aware of the fact 
that, as a society, we face policy trade-offs. They enlist 
examples of political decisions to be made: 
Should a national credit-card service be prohibited from using a 
sophisticated personal data system to prevent its card holders from 
going on irresponsible spending sprees? Should school districts be 
forbidden to use personal data systems to help prevent children 
from becoming delinquents? These are difficult questions to 
answer.60 
 
 56. Id. at 21. 
 57. Id. at 23. 
 58. See RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 53–55 (2008). But see SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, 
THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE 
NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 293–328 (2019). 
 59. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 26. 
 60. Id. at 27. 
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They immediately indicate why these decisions will be 
difficult not only policy-wise (agreeing on values and goals), 
but also in regard to the knowledge necessary to make them: 
Often the immediate costs of not using systems to take preemptive 
action against individuals can be estimated (in both dollars and 
predictable social disruption), while the long-term costs of 
increasing the capacity of organizations to anticipate, and thus to 
control, the behavior of individuals can be discussed only 
speculatively.61 
The Report’s authors knew that automated personal 
data processing, even if conducted for noble purposes, 
increases the potential for coercing individual behavior by 
private and public organizations. They acknowledged that 
this “coercion” might sometimes be socially desirable, but 
they claimed that a political decision about whether to allow 
it or not, might be difficult to make if the processes are 
secret,62 policy decisions are framed as technical ones, and 
data gathered for the originally accepted purpose is 
combined with other data, and used for some other purpose 
later on. In other words, they acknowledged that in order to 
take some policy decisions on a societal level, what is 
necessary is to establish mechanisms for bringing these 
questions to the fore, both concerning those tradeoffs we face 
already, as well as questions concerning the future “long-
term costs of increasing the capacity of organizations to 
anticipate, and thus to control, the behavior of individuals.”63  
Interestingly, the authors directed their attention to the 
question of “privacy” only after they discussed all these other 
concerns. Following the claims made in the literature of their 
times,64 they argued that the concept of “privacy” must be 
 
 61. Id. at 27–28. 
 62. Id. at 28–29 (“Today it is much easier for computer-based record keeping 
to affect people than for people to affect computer-based record keeping.”). 
 63. Id. at 28. 
 64. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. OF 
THE EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1967); 
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 493 (1968). 
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refined and expanded. They stated that in the era of 
automated personal data processing “an individual’s 
personal privacy is directly affected by the kind of disclosure 
and use made of identifiable information about him in a 
record.”65 The “and use” part is absolutely crucial here. It 
suggests that the meaning assigned to the term “privacy” 
was expanded in the Report to other individual interests of 
persons, qualitatively different from the “disclosure” actions 
which were traditionally associated with “privacy” in the 
canonical Warren and Brandeis article,66 as well as the 
typical formulations of the privacy torts.67 
One should notice that this conceptual move was not 
inevitable. Arguably, an individual’s view on her personal 
information being disclosed to others, and the use to which 
this information is put, need not be strongly correlated. For 
example, I might strongly prefer that no one learns about the 
“guilty pleasure” music I listen to on Spotify but 
simultaneously welcome algorithmic suggestions of similar 
songs. Or, conversely, I might be fine with everybody 
knowing what my religious convictions are, but would 
strongly prefer that this information was not used in the 
process of assessing my creditworthiness, during the hiring 
process, or for directing political communications at me. 
These two “dimensions” of privacy: disclosure and usage of 
information about a person, can be treated jointly (as the 
authors did) or separately, as I argue would be beneficial.68 
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that when making 
 
 65. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 40–41 (emphasis added).  
 66. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 204 (1890). 
 67. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) 
(enumerating four types of privacy torts: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s 
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2. Public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3. Publicity which places the 
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s 
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”). 
 68. See infra Section IV.A. 
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recommendations about “privacy,” the Report’s authors 
treated these dimensions jointly.  
Within this frame, the authors of the 1973 Report 
expressed their normative view that: “personal privacy, as it 
relates to personal-data record keeping, must be understood 
in terms of a concept of mutuality.”69 Since individuals and 
organizations often have different though legitimate 
interests, the role of law is not to endow any of them with the 
unilateral choice of the ways in which data will be used, nor 
is it to make the choice regardless of the parties’ 
preferences.70 Rather, the law should create conditions for a 
process through which all the interested parties will be able 
to voice their concerns.71 
What were these conditions supposed to be? 
B. Recommendations Made: Legislate to Create Public 
Deliberations 
The Report divided its recommendations into several 
parts, but from this Article’s perspective two are significant: 
“Safeguards for Privacy” (Chapter III) and “Recommended 
Safeguards for Administrative Personal Data Systems” 
(Chapter IV).72 The former contained what came to be known 
as “Fair Information Practice Principles,” later picked up and 
adopted (in a morphed manner) in the U.S. “notice and 
choice” model.73 The latter laid the ground for the axiological 
and conceptual framework which, through the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data,74 the 1981 Council of Europe 
 
 69. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 40. 
 70. Id. at 43–44. 
 71. Id. 
 72. These were followed by specific questions concerning statistical and 
research data analysis, usage of Social Security Numbers as universal identifiers, 
and other more technical questions, in Chapters V–IX. 
 73. See infra Section III.A. 
 74. Ministerial Council of the Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., 
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Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data,75 and the 1995 EU 
Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
such Data76 made their way to the GDPR.77 Importantly, 
however, the authors of the Report saw both parts as 
elements of the same response. Since “privacy,” in their 
understanding, encompassed entitlements to participate in 
deciding about how personal data will be used, both the 
general principles and the specific frame turning them into 
concrete practice were designed as parts of the same system. 
The general frame of the proposal was based on five “Fair 
Information Practices Principles”: 
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose 
very existence is secret. 
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what 
information about him is in a record and how it is used. 
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information 
about him obtained for one purpose from being used or made 
available for other purposes without his consent.  
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a 
record of identifiable information about him.  
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating 
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of 
 
Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection 
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)58/FINAL 
(Sept. 23, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 OECD Guidelines], https://www.oecd.org/ 
internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowso
fpersonaldata.htm.  
 75. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 
[hereinafter Convention 108], https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/rms/0900001680078b37. 
 76. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, O.J. (L 281) 31 
[hereinafter 1995 Directive]. 
 77. See infra Section I.C. 
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the data for their intended use and must take reasonable 
precautions to prevent misuse of the data.78  
These principles expressed the general axiology of the 
Report’s authors’ argument: transparency, mutuality and 
the procedural nature of the regulatory frame. To turn these 
principles into social reality, the authors suggested: 
The enactment of legislation establishing a Code of Fair 
Information Practice for all Automated personal data systems . . . 
[providing for] both civil and criminal penalties . . . injunctions . . . 
right to bring suits for unfair information practices to recover 
actual, liquidated, and punitive damages, in individual or class 
actions.79 
They expressly argued against self-regulatory 
approaches, pointing out that the companies might not have 
sufficient incentives to self-regulate.80 The foreseen 
legislation, applicable to both private and public 
organizations, would divide safeguards applicable to every 
data management system into three parts: (i) “General 
Requirements”; (ii) “Public Notice Requirement”; and (iii) 
“Rights of Individual Data Subjects.”81 
“General Requirements,” among others, stipulated: 
prohibition of data transfers to other organizations without 
the explicit consent of the data subject, and mandatory 
requirements for the systems’ security and personnel’s 
training.82 The former is extremely important, as this is one 
of the major divergence points between the US and the EU. 
In the American model, an acceptance of the privacy policy 
containing a blank right to transfer to “business partners” 
renders such transfers lawful, while in the EU each transfer 
should be separately “legalized,” for example through an 
 
 78. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 41. 
 79. Id. at 50.  
 80. Id. at 52. 
 81. Id. at 53–64. 
 82. Id. at 53–55. 
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informed consent; and notified every time it occurs.83 The 
latter remained present in the data management regimes in 
the US and the EU, playing a significant role in the GDPR’s 
framework.84 
The “Public Notice Requirement”  stipulated that every 
organization processing data in automated manner shall 
make publicly available the information on, among others: 
“the nature and purpose(s) of the system”; “the categories 
and number of persons on whom data are (to be) 
maintained”; “the categories of data (to be) maintained”; “the 
organization’s policies and practices regarding data storage, 
duration of retention of data, and disposal thereof”; “the 
categories of data sources; a description of all types of use (to 
be) made of data.”85 This recommendation would later lead 
to the idea of “privacy policies,” i.e. documents serving as 
vehicles of “notice” for consumers in the American model; 
and the transparency requirements in the European model.86 
However, in the view of the authors, the role played by the 
public notice was supposed to be fact-conferring, not norm-
creating. Note that within this view, the “public notice” was 
not supposed to be a contract. Rather, it was meant to serve 
a purpose equivalent to the “nutrition facts” table on food 
products. Companies would be liable for misleading the 
public, but a person’s “agreement” was not necessarily to be 
equated with granting the company a right to engage in 
these practices. The norms stipulating what data can be used 
for were to be enshrined elsewhere, in sectorial legislation.   
Finally, every person about whom data is automatically 
processed was to be endowed, by legislation, with a set of 
mandatory rights. To realize these rights, every organization 
processing personal data was supposed to, among others: 
enable an individual to know whether he or she is the subject 
 
 83. See GDPR, supra note 32, arts. 6, 12, 14. 
 84. See id. arts. 32–34. 
 85. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 57–58. 
 86. See GDPR, supra note 32, arts. 12–14. 
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of data in the system; assure that no use of individually 
identifiable data is made that is not within the stated 
purposes of the system; inform an individual, upon his or her 
request, about the uses made of data about them, and about 
the identity of all persons and organizations involved; 
maintain procedures that allow an individual who is the 
subject of data in the system to contest their accuracy 
completeness, pertinence, and the necessity for retaining 
them; and permit data to be corrected or amended when the 
individual to whom they pertain so requests.87 “Data subjects 
rights,” though absent in the “notice and choice” model of 
American data management law, became one of the 
cornerstones of the European model. The (in)famous “right 
to be forgotten”88 can be directly traced back to the 1973 idea 
that a person should have a right to “contest necessity for 
retaining a piece of data.” Arguably, this part became the 
source of the “individualist bias” in the further development 
of the American and European regimes.89 
Importantly, all three elements: general rules, public 
notice, and individual rights were intended to give substance 
to the Fair Information Practice Principles. In the Report 
authors’ view, such a legal frame was most likely to create 
the conditions for public deliberations on the limits of 
personal data processing. The intended effects of the 
enactment of the Code of Fair Information Practice were 
described as follows: 
The proposed safeguards are intended to assure that decisions 
about collecting, recording, storing, disseminating, and using 
identifiable personal data will be made with full consciousness and 
 
 87. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 59–63. 
 88. For a legal-theoretical discussion of the right to be forgotten, see Giovanni 
Sartor, The Right to Be Forgotten: Balancing Interests in the Flux of Time, 24 
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 72 (2016). For a policy analysis from the domestic 
perspective, see Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2017); Daniel Lyons, Assessing the Right to Be Forgotten, 
59 BOS. BAR J. 26, 28 (2015); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 
64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 92 (2012). 
 89. See infra Section IV.B. 
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consideration of issues of personal privacy—issues that arise from 
inherent conflicts and contradictions in values and interests. Our 
recommended safeguards cannot assure resolution of those conflicts 
to the satisfaction of all individuals and groups involved. However, 
they can assure that those conflicts will be fully recognized and that 
the decision-making processes in both the private and public 
sectors, which lead to assigning higher priority to one interest than 
to another, will be open, informed, and fair.90 
In other words, the authors saw the role of the proposed 
legislation not as the ultimate answer to the question of what 
practices should be allowed and what not. They understood 
that such legislation is necessary to create a forum where, in 
the societal and political processes, further decisions about 
particular uses will be made. They were also aware that no 
one-size-fits-all solution is feasible.91 Even though they do 
not use the word, the authors were aware of the possibility 
of externalities, and the need to regulate in order to mitigate 
them: 
The past two decades have given America intensive lessons in the 
difficulty of trying to check or compensate for undesirable side-
effects stemming from headlong application and exploitation of 
complex technologies. Water pollution, air pollution, the annual 
highway death toll, suburban sprawl, and urban decay are all 
unanticipated consequences of the too narrowly conceived and 
largely unconstrained applications of technology.92 
All this taken together: the plea for public disclosure, for 
deliberation and for balancing interests—uttered by people 
who, in principle, saw development of computers as a 
positive phenomenon—signals the authors’ hope that the 
enactment of the Code of Fair Information Practice by the 
U.S. Congress would have been just the first step. They did 
not explicitly outline how they hoped the further 
deliberations would look like. Nevertheless, we know that 
the problems they foresaw included the rise of uncontrolled 
power to coerce behavior, the emergence of engineers being 
 
 90. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 43–44. 
 91. Id. at 43. 
 92. Id. at 45. 
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de facto policymakers, and negative effects affecting the most 
vulnerable people. To remedy them, they wanted to install 
procedural guarantees providing for societal control and, 
potentially, further regulation of particular sectors. 
What followed was a much more limited intervention. 
C. What Followed: The Transatlantic Split and the 
Technocratic Turn 
The most direct and immediate effect of the Report’s 
publication was the enactment of the 1974 Privacy Act.93 
This legislation closely mirrored the recommendations of the 
Report. Several substantive rules were put in place, 
including the purpose limitation principle, and the citizens 
were granted various rights, among others to access and 
correct their personal data.94 Nevertheless, the Privacy Act 
applied (and applies) only to the Federal Agencies.95 General 
in its material scope (as a matter of a rule, it governs all the 
personal data gathered by the federal agencies about citizens 
for all the purposes), Privacy Act remained limited in its 
subjective scope of application, governing just one part of 
only the public sector. 
Several other statutes followed. Importantly, the 
approach taken by the legislature has from the beginning 
been sectoral. The legislative acts adopted by Congress 
included: Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974,96 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,97 Video 
 
 93. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)). 
 94. See ARTHUR A. BUSHKIN & SAMUEL I. SCHAEN, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: A 
REFERENCE MANUAL FOR COMPLIANCE 7 (1976). 
 95. Id. at 11–13. 
 96. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012)). 
 97. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549 (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012)). 
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Privacy Protection Act of 1988,98 Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act of 199199 and many others.100 
The sectoral, “issue by issue” approach remains the 
defining feature of the American data management law. In 
itself, this approach has been faithful to the 1973 Report, in 
which the authors argued against one, top-down solution to 
all possible negative effects of data processing.101 However, 
the condition for making sure that the “issue by issue” 
approach would be, in the authors’ view, “open, informed, 
and fair”102 has never been fully realized. Within this legal 
framework, defined by the sectoral approach and lack of 
general data transparency, the “notice and choice” paradigm 
would be born in the 1990s, influenced however by different 
ideologies and tacit normativities. The Report would be cited 
and referred to, though as we will see, the ultimate shape of 
the end product would look little like the original idea. The 
addressee of the disclosure would change from the public to 
the individual, requirements about its concreteness would be 
watered down, and the free market would be treated as 
choice making mechanism superior to politics and 
regulation. As a result, since the late 1990s, essentially no 
new federal legislation governing data collection and usage 
has been enacted. New types of costs created by the business 
models of Google, Facebook and Amazon were not followed 
by new sectoral legislative interventions. The Report called 
for collective decision-making mechanisms, in essence 
political. The law of today leaves the decisions to the 
individuals and is in essence market-based. 
 
 98. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (2012)). 
 99. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243 (codified 
at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)). 
 100. For the list of the acts adopted as a response to the emergence of internet, 
see infra p. 53. For the list of all privacy acts adopted in the United States, see 
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 36–39. 
 101. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 42–43. 
 102. Id. at 44. 
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In Europe, the story took a different path. In 1980 the 
OECD Guidelines103 were published, and in 1981 the Council 
of Europe’s Convention 108 would follow.104 This Convention 
would closely mirror both the vocabulary of the Report 
(“personal data,” “data subject,” “processing”) and its general 
axiology (public notice, purpose limitation principle, need for 
regulation). However, it would do so as a part of its mandate 
to protect the human right to privacy.105 It would oblige the 
Member States to enact legislation on personal data 
“protection”; a general law applicable to both private and 
public sectors. National laws enacted to fulfill these 
obligations would be further harmonized in 1995 via the 
European Union Directive106 and unified and modernized in 
2016 with the GDPR.107 In the meantime, the European 
Union would declare “personal data protection” a 
fundamental right, essentially equivalent to the position 
enjoyed in the US by the Bill of Rights.108  
The European regimes would closely follow the 
recommendation of the 1973 report, by operating within the 
frame of (i) general principles; (ii) public notice; (iii) subjects 
rights.109 However, since the body through which the 
legislation would be adopted would be the Council of Europe, 
an international organization created to protect human 
rights, the reception of the idea would be conducted within 
the “privacy is a human right” ideology. This, taken together 
with the “direct effect doctrine”110 would largely influence the 
 
 103. 1980 OECD Guidelines, supra note 74. 
 104. Convention 108, supra note 75. 
 105. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 106. 1995 Directive, supra note 76. 
 107. GDPR, supra note 32. 
 108. See generally GLORIA GONZALEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL 
DATA PROTECTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU (2014). 
 109. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 110. Broadly speaking, in the European Union law, unlike in the United 
States, constitutional rights are directly applicable in the private relations 
between the market players. See ELENI FRANTIZIOU, THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF 
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shape of the final product. The GDPR, direct descendant of 
the 95/46 directive and the 108 Convention, would impose 
much more strict general rules than the American system. 
However, it would also focus primarily on the individual, 
rather than collective interests, apply only to “identifiable” 
persons, and employ technocratic solutions rather than 
political ones. 
To be clear, proving that the 1973 Report directly 
influenced the 1981 Convention 108 is a difficult task, and I 
would not defend a strong claim that without the Report, the 
European system would necessarily look differently. Other 
European countries, like Great Britain or Sweden, have been 
adopting their own data protection laws  at the time, and we 
know that the authors of the 1973 Report were in contact 
with them.111 One can only assume that the exchange of 
ideas happened in both directions. However, two things can 
be demonstrated beyond doubt. First, the final product of the 
Council of Europe, and ultimately the GDPR, follows the 
structure and terminology of the 1973 Report’s 
recommendations. Second, when Council of Europe 
commissioned its own recommendations in 1973112 and 
1974,113 they used different terminology and ultimately 
adopted that of the 1973 Report (they spoke of “personal 
information” instead of “personal data,” “individuals” instead 
of “data subjects” etc.).  However, from the policy perspective, 
it does not matter whether the drafters of the European 
regime read the 1973 Report and decided to implement it, or 
whether these ideas the Report enshrined made their way to 
 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
(2019). 
 111. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at x.  
 112. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Res. (74) 29 On the Protection of the 
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Private Sector (Sept. 
26, 1973), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCT 
MContent?documentId=0900001680502830. 
 113. Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Res. (74) 29 On the Protection of the 
Privacy of Individuals vis-à-vis Electronic Data Banks in the Public Sector (Sept. 
20, 1974), https://rm.coe.int/16804d1c51. 
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Europe through the conversations among experts indirectly 
through the 1980 OECD guidelines. What matters is that 
already in 1973 the American administration was in 
possession of the report suggesting something very similar to 
today’s GDPR and that both the American law and the GDPR 
failed to properly respond to challenges that this Report set 
forth. 
Before discussing the current shape of both regimes, the 
ways in which they lead to the creation of the data analytics 
society, and the ways in which they fail at mitigating the 
social costs, let us first see what the last forty-five years of 
socio-technological changes brought about. To fully 
appreciate the mistakes which were committed while forging 
the “notice and choice” and “personal data protection” 
models, one needs to better understand the socio-
technological reality at the dawn of the 2020s. What goes 
without saying, a lot has changed since 1973. 
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II. SOCIAL COSTS OF DATA MANAGEMENT 
When identifying the threats of using computers to 
process personal data, the authors of the 1973 Report were 
engaging in speculation, but it turns out that they were 
prescient. Forty-five years later, we have empirical studies 
documenting what the negative effects of technological data 
processing have become, and are able to see which of them 
resulted from not having lived up to the recommendations 
put forward. In this Part, I analyze the developments in the 
techno-sociological practice of collection and usage of 
personal data and study the social costs they generate. These 
costs encompass both the knowledge that companies are able 
to infer about people and the various negative effects of using 
this knowledge in their interactions. I look at three 
examples: price discrimination, behavior manipulation, and 
social segmentation; and show how the law we have today 
sanctions these costly behaviors, as well as why it is unable 
to prevent them. After this analysis, I will move to the closer 
study of both models of data governance in Part III. 
A. Technological Foundations of the Data Analytics Society 
Three significant technological breakthroughs have 
occurred since the publication of the 1973 Report: the 
miniaturization and widespread distribution of (mobile) 
computers,114 the emergence of the public internet,115 and 
the rise of machine learning techniques regarding data 
analytics and problem-solving.116 As of today, in 2020, it is 
 
 114. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAN ASPRAY, COMPUTER: A HISTORY OF 
INFORMATION MACHINE 233–300 (1996); ADAM GREENFIELD, EVERYWARE: THE 
DAWNING AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING (2006); GEORGES IFRAH, THE UNIVERSAL 
HISTORY OF COMPUTING: FROM THE ABACUS TO THE QUANTUM COMPUTER 302–47 
(2001). 
 115. See JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 195–200 (1999); ZITTRAIN, 
supra note 34, at 26–30. 
 116. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9; Nello Cristianini, The Road to Artificial 
Intelligence: A Case of Data Over Theory, NEW SCIENTIST (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23230971-200-the-irresistible-rise-of-
590 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
common for individuals to own personal computers and 
mobile devices,117 constantly connected to the internet, 
serving as access points to various online services. Some 
previously analog activities, like shopping, news 
consumption or banking have gradually moved online; some 
new forms of social behavior, like social media, “sharing 
economy”118 or multimedia streaming have emerged. At the 
same time, these devices and services function as data 
collectors for tech companies. 
The “data analytics society” we currently live in, I argue, 
is characterized by three latent effects: (i) seamless data 
collection, facilitated by people’s usage of smartphones and 
other connected devices; (ii) inferred knowledge, that is 
corporations’ ability to find patterns in data sets and 
establish probabilities using machine learning techniques; 
and (iii) automated decision making, where “decision” should 
be understood broadly, as a computer’s choice to generate 
some output without a direct command by a human, for 
example, to show a particular ad to a particular person in a 
given moment.119 All three phenomena are interrelated, but 
for analytical purposes let us consider each separately. 
Seamless data collection is possible due to individuals’ 
continuous reliance on technology. When a person carries an 
internet-connected smartphone on them all the time, it is 
difficult to draw a sharp distinction between being “online” 
and “offline.”120 All the activities undertaken via a 
 
artificial-intelligence/.  
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 119. See Mik supra note 4, at 1. 
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smartphone leave a digital footprint.121 From dating to 
searching for information to shopping, to transport and to 
communications, more and more data is generated as a side 
product of our daily activities. If one halts a taxi on a street 
and pays cash, there is no record. Uber makes a record. When 
one eats in a restaurant, there is no record. Grubhub makes 
a record. When one consults a physical encyclopedia, there is 
no record. Google knows what we are searching for. All this 
data collection occurs in the background, sometimes without 
individuals’ knowledge, and usually without any human’s 
additional effort to store information on top of conducting the 
service. The “easy access” that the authors of the 1973 Report 
worried about has become a reality, both due to the 
technological developments, and the law’s sanctioning of 
these practices. An individual’s “choice” in the American law, 
and a “consent” in the European model are sufficient legal 
basis to collect personal data and share it with other 
organizations.122 
As a side product, large amounts of data are generated. 
Ethem Alpaydin calls this the “dataquake”,123 while the term 
best known to the general public is “big data.”124 Big data is 
often characterized by the “3 Vs”: volume, variety, and 
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velocity.125 From the perspective of a human mind, there is 
too much data to process, the sets are too heterogeneous to 
make sense of, and the speed of analysis necessary to process 
them surpasses our abilities. Recall that “too much data to 
process” has also been identified as one of the latent effects 
of computerization by the authors of the 1973 Report. What 
they feared would happen was the organizations “simplifying 
the world,” distorting the picture of reality by forcing people 
to fit themselves into the pre-defined categories. In some 
spheres, this did indeed occur.126 However, there was 
another possible strategy for organizations to adopt. Instead 
of simplifying the data, one could try to increase the 
performance of data analyzing technologies. And this is what 
happened. Data analytics, and in particular machine 
learning, underwent significant progress in the last decade, 
turning the “too much data to process” burden into a data 
blessing.127 
Inferred knowledge results from organizations’ ability to 
apply sophisticated data analytics techniques to detect 
patterns in the big data collections.128 Data now reveals more 
information about individuals than what one could directly 
observe. Studied in isolation, the fact that I am of a given 
gender and age, live in a specific town, like chicken waffles 
and Marvel movies, might say not much more than simply 
that. However, this data, seen against data about millions of 
other people who in some regard are “(not) like me,” and 
additional data about them, allows companies to infer what 
are my political views,129 what products I might be willing to 
buy, and what social cause to donate to. This is not 
“knowledge” in the sense in which philosophers would define 
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it, but is what Ethem Alpaydin calls “a good and useful 
approximation.”130 If a company knows something about me 
with an 87% probability, this “knowledge” presents 
significant value. 
This knowledge can be further refined, through 
automatic communication and feedback loops. Have you ever 
seen an irrelevant ad and thought “how would they ever 
think that I can be into that?!” One of the reasons why the 
algorithm displayed it to you might have been to confirm the 
probability that people within your demographics are not 
interested in such things. Various technological 
advancements, in particular machine learning, are currently 
being employed to not only find patterns in existing data sets 
but also to refine these data sets, test hypotheses and fill in 
the loopholes.131 This “knowledge” can later be used in an 
automated way. To stay with the example of advertisements, 
a task that a human gives to a machine could be “display this 
ad to 1000 people with the highest probability of clicking.” 
The machine would estimate, based on the existing data, who 
has the highest chance of clicking (or even start at random) 
and then through numerous feedback loops improve the 
estimation over time.132  
Apart from advertising, this technology can power 
“decisions” on what flight price to display,133 whose profile to 
show on dating apps, or what music to suggest. Automated 
“decision” making pertains not only to “decisions” in the 
strict sense (grant or refuse a credit card, approve a refund 
or invite for a job interview); but essentially all activities of 
computer-systems that are not 100% pre-programmed. 
Given the machine-learning basis of these systems, humans 
 
 130. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 9, at 14. 
 131. Id. at 113–68. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason & Michael P. Wellman, Automated Markets 
and Trading Agents, in 2 HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS (Leigh 
Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd eds., 2006). 
594 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
developing and deploying them will have a general idea on 
what the software will do (the goals are specified manually); 
but might not be able to fully predict all possible outcomes 
(resulting from the available data).134 Importantly, these 
“automated decisions” are, at the same time, a tool to provide 
services and to collect new/feedback data. In this sense, when 
a “smart” algorithm performs a task, it simultaneously tries 
to achieve the best possible outcome and generates feedback 
on its own performance, so that the next time, it will be more 
efficient. It is these characteristics taken together that led to 
a widespread popular referral to machine-learning-based 
technologies as “artificial intelligence.”135 
Note two things. First, for all this to function it is by no 
means necessary that you are “personally identified” or 
“identifiable.”136 In many cases, companies engaging in 
commercial activities based on data collection, analysis and 
automated communication really do not need to know what 
is your name, Social Security Number, address or any other 
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personal characteristic. What they need to know is what 
features you have and how you behave in response to what 
stimuli. There needs to be an ability to track you somehow 
(for example, by assigning a number to your browser or your 
device), but from a corporation’s point of view, it is often 
perfectly fine if you are anonymous. Legally speaking, many 
companies might prefer not to personally identify you—the 
less they know who you are, the more they are legally 
allowed to learn about how you are.137 That is one of the 
reasons why “privacy” approaches based on the concept of 
“personally identifiable information” do not fully match the 
potential risks in the data analytics society. It might be the 
case that in situations where individual and societal 
interests are most at stake, privacy protections simply are 
not triggered.  
Second, notice the externalities. By allowing a company 
to collect and study information about myself, even if we 
assume I am fully aware of what they plan to do with my 
data, I impose a cost on (or at least make a decision about) 
you and other people. If I make it clear what my political 
views or religious convictions are, essentially everything I do 
online can later be used to infer knowledge about other 
people’s religion and politics. “Everything you say can and 
will be used against other people” would be a fair statement 
to include in the privacy policies written within the “notice 
and choice” paradigm. The more things I buy on Amazon, the 
more refined suggestions to other customers will be. If I am 
convinced, or not convinced, by a political ad, I help ensure 
that its next reiteration will be even more successful in 
manipulating people’s preferences and behavior. Even if I 
fully agree to the collection of my data, I impose costs on you 
and our fellow humans. I should not be allowed to do this so 
easily. 
These two aspects, the possibility to harm people while 
they are anonymous, and the risk of being harmed as a result 
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of other people’s actions, are significant weaknesses of the 
current approaches to data management. In the following 
section, I study three examples of these harms, i.e. social 
costs of data management, in detail. Having done so, in Part 
III, I will demonstrate how this state of affairs is sanctioned 
by the existing data management laws, and pinpoint where 
I believe they should be modified. 
B. Direct and Indirect Social Costs: Knowledge In-Use and 
Knowledge In-Itself 
Two general types of social costs exist in the data 
analytics society: new knowledge about persons, and the 
potentially negative consequences of acting upon that 
knowledge. On the one hand, there are external effects of 
individual behavior concerned with knowledge: when 
disclosing some personal data, I indirectly reveal information 
about other people. This does not yet bring about actual 
harms to others, but increases the potential for harm. On the 
other hand, there are costs of the uses to which companies 
can put this knowledge. Data-driven price discrimination, 
behavior manipulation or social segmentation are actions 
costly to some people, and the society as a whole, resulting 
from the technological capabilities of tech companies and the 
law’s sanctioning of these practices.  
The distinction between “knowledge in-itself” and “in-
use,” or between potential and actual harms, matters not 
only conceptually, but also policy-wise. Depending on one’s 
normative theory, one could argue that the mere fact that 
Amazon, Google or Facebook know so much about their users 
is problematic and should be prevented; or emphasize that 
we should prevent only certain activities based on this data. 
Further, as I will show in Part IV, both collection and usage 
can be objects of regulation, and the choice will depend on 
one’s regulatory objectives. With these distinctions in mind, 
let us consider three examples of costly external effects: price 
discrimination, behavior manipulation, and social 
segmentation. 
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1. Examples: Price Discrimination, Behavior 
Manipulation and Social Segmentation 
First, consider price discrimination.138 Put simply, price 
discrimination means charging different customers different 
prices for exactly the same good or service. Imagine two 
people, Amy and Barbara, none of whom directly reveals 
what their income is. Amy is friends on Facebook with 
colleagues boasting about their high-paid jobs, watches 
videos about golf, and searches with Google for piano classes 
for children.139 Assume that this suggests, with a high 
probability, that her income is above $100,000. Barbara, on 
the other hand, engages in online activities associated with 
a low-income social group. Now consider a company, let us 
call it Umbrella Corporation, selling widgets. Imagine that a 
total cost of producing and marketing a widget is $10, so any 
price above $10 generates profit. Assume that in a brick-and-
mortar retail store, where the same price must be used 
regardless of who is the buyer, Umbrella would sell widgets 
at the supply and demand equilibrium price of $15. Online, 
however, Umbrella has access to information about Amy and 
Barbara and can try to display different prices to different 
customers. Based on the knowledge inferred about Amy’s 
and Barbara’s income, it charges the former $20, while the 
latter $11. This is costly for Amy, who ends up paying $5 
more than she normally would, but beneficial for Barbara 
and for the Umbrella Corporation.  
Second, think about behavior manipulation.140 Imagine 
that Umbrella Corporation engages in online advertising, 
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and wants to increase the chance of consumers purchasing 
widgets while browsing the net on their smartphones. What 
makes e-commerce different from brick and mortar shops is 
the option of immediate purchases, clicking on an ad and 
having concluded a contract three minutes later. Umbrella 
collects data about past engagement, and its algorithm 
establishes that people with characteristics similar to Amy 
are most prone to buy the widget when seeing the ad early in 
the morning, especially if they went to sleep later than usual. 
Amy-types also like the widget being advertised by fit, young 
people. At the same time, people with characteristics similar 
to Barbara, most often buy widgets when shown the ad late 
at night, and especially when coming back from their 
friends’. They are most convinced by ads that have widgets 
advertised by people who look like a happy family. With this 
knowledge, Umbrella fine-tunes the timing, content, and 
form of the widget ads, and manages to increase the sales by 
20%. This is profitable to Umbrella but can be costly to Amy 
and Barbara. If for most of the time, they would not be 
willing to buy a widget, but do so when shown an ad at the 
moment when they are most prone to engage in unnecessary 
spending, the actual cost they pay is higher than the overall 
utility they derive from owning a widget. This, again, is 
possible not because they have revealed anything about their 
preferences or behavior patterns, but because other people, 
with similar characteristics, have done so. 
Third, there is a risk of social segmentation, 
discrimination, or even social exclusion.141 Imagine that 
Umbrella Corporation wants its products to be associated 
only with certain social classes. It will attempt to display the 
widget ads only to those who seem to belong to these classes. 
In the world of billboards, TV ads and brick and mortar 
stores, most members of the society can see ads of the same 
products, and most of them have the ability to buy those 
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products in physical stores. However, in a data analytics 
society, when everyone sees mostly their own set of ads, 
displayed on their own smartphones, social segmentation 
can occur. Only people like Amy are offered to buy widgets, 
while people like Barbara are not. Or imagine that Umbrella 
Corporation wants to hire new workers, and for some reason 
ends up displaying the job-ads only to people like Amy. Or, 
in this case, probably people like Andy.142 This is costly for 
Barbara-types, who not only are not offered to buy a widget 
or work for Umbrella, but might even not be aware of these 
products’ and jobs’ existence. This is also costly for society as 
well. If different members of a community are exposed to 
different types of content, the social division, resulting from 
exposure to different communications, might increase. 
2. The Politics of Data-Driven Social Costs 
One could argue that all the costs described above are 
neither new nor necessarily bad. In the end, one could say, 
sellers always wanted to maximize profits by charging the 
highest possible price and engaging in the most convincing 
advertising. Consumers and workers have always bought 
different products, and worked different kinds of jobs, 
depending on their material situation. This is how capitalism 
works, and even though the system is not perfect, and some 
inequalities will necessarily persist, the overall outcome is 
the best possible one. 
These two objections must be addressed together. 
I argue that the question of whether data-driven social 
costs are new or not is a wrong question to ask. No one can 
deny that the above-mentioned practices existed, in some 
form, long before the emergence of computers, not to mention 
the internet and machine learning. At the same time, it is 
difficult to refute a claim that the amount of knowledge that 
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corporations have accumulated about individuals, paired 
with their ability to directly act upon that knowledge, is 
unprecedented. The source of this knowledge has shifted as 
well, from individuals freely disclosing information about 
themselves, to having knowledge inferred from the behavior 
of others who, themselves, might not realize what data is 
being collected. Whether these shifts make up a qualitative 
or only quantitative change is, ultimately, of secondary 
importance. What matters is that they have occurred, and 
normative questions can be asked about them. 
This paper makes a plea to bring these questions to the 
fore. Whether the practices discussed above should be 
assessed negatively and mitigated through regulation, or 
not, is ultimately a political decision to make. Let us get back 
to the examples for a while. 
Imagine that Umbrella Corporation shows higher prices 
to people whom it believes are wealthier and lower to those 
whom it believes possess fewer funds. One could argue that, 
given the inequalities in society, it is fair if richer people 
subsidize purchases by those less fortunate. Or, one could 
argue that these practices should be discouraged, as they 
diminish the overall efficiency and lead to a quasi-
monopolistic behavior. However, imagine that Umbrella does 
the opposite. Since it wishes to have widgets associated only 
with some social classes, it ends up showing a higher price to 
Barbara, and lower to Amy. Does this change our normative 
assessment? Does the type of product they offer matter? 
Would it make a difference if Umbrella was selling 
pharmaceutical products, or energy, or books?  
Further, consider a world in which Umbrella does not 
sell widgets, but leads an election campaign of a certain 
political party. Instead of encouraging people to buy its 
products, it uses all the data it manages to find to discourage 
people from voting for the other party.143 Or, it manages to 
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modify people’s news feeds in a way that leads to a social 
segmentation of the content they ultimately receive.144 
Would our assessment of its activities change if, instead of 
marketing products, Umbrella Corporation engaged in data-
driven behavior manipulation and social segmentation 
aimed at influencing an outcome of a political process? 
The answer is yes, such details matter. Possibly, certain 
outcomes of data-driven behavior invite more regulatory 
scrutiny than others. However, to know that, we need to 
understand the data-driven practices of tech companies, as 
the authors of the 1973 Report argued. And we need to 
engage in deliberations about these practices, in political, 
issue-by-issue manner. Unfortunately, as of today, the 
answer regarding the acceptable uses of data about persons 
is given by individualistic, technocratic, “one-size-fits-all” 
solutions offered by “notice and choice” and “personal data 
protection” regimes.145 
In the following Part, I show how the currently binding 
legal regimes were created, to help legal reformers 
understand why the law ended up sanctioning these types of 
costly practices, and in what aspects these regimes are ill-
suited to manage the costs of data analytics. 
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III. THE EXISTING PARADIGMS: “NOTICE AND CHOICE” VS. 
“PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION” 
As of 2020, two competing visions of data management 
law exist in the transatlantic sphere: the American “notice 
and choice” model and the European “personal data 
protection” model.146 Both can be traced back to the 1973 
Report and the recommendations it made. In many aspects, 
they look very much unlike one another. However, even 
though the American system is grounded in market logic, 
while the European system is in the logic of human rights, 
both fall prey to the same three mistakes. Both look at the 
problem of social costs of data management through the lens 
of “privacy,” both concentrate on individual interests instead 
of collective ones, and both employ technocratic means to 
address these costs. 
A. American Model: Individual “Notice and Choice” 
Within the “notice and choice” paradigm, companies that 
want to collect and use personal information about the users 
of their websites and apps should inform the customers about 
their data practices (“notice”). In turn, consumers decide 
whether they are willing to use the services and disclose 
personal information to companies or not (“choice”).147 
“Notice” usually occurs through a publication of a “privacy 
policy” (sometimes called a “privacy notice”),148 while the 
choice might be either expressed explicitly when ticking a 
box next to a statement like “I have read and accept the 
privacy policy,” or implicitly through accessing the service or 
using the app.149 In this sense, “notice and choice” posits the 
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decision about acceptable data practices as a market 
transaction between a user and the company. 
This market logic has profound consequences for the 
shape of the normative framework governing data practices, 
and ultimately for the nature of the data analytics society. 
The answer to a legal question a company might ponder: 
“what data am I allowed to collect, and what can I do with 
it?” stems from a contract. This contract is written by the 
company itself, and offered to consumers in a boilerplate 
form, “take it or leave it,” with no space for negotiation.150 As 
long as the company clearly states its plans in the “privacy 
policy,” and the consumers accept it, the contents of the 
contract essentially make up the norms the company must 
abide by. 
Whether a privacy policy should be considered a “real” 
contract or not is disputed in the legal scholarship, with 
arguments being raised both for the affirmative and the 
negative answer.151 However, this disagreement is about the 
most common form of enforcement of privacy policies, not 
their norm-creating nature. What suffices to state here is 
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is ready to police 
companies that do not abide by their own policies.152 It does 
so based on Section 5, giving the FTC mandate to police 
“unfair and deceptive trade practices.”153 FTC will both 
initiate proceedings against companies who do act contrary 
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to their own policies,154 as well as analyze the contents of 
these policies to determine whether the stipulated practices 
could be deemed “unfair.”155 
In other words, the freedom of these “contracts” is not 
absolute, but most of the constraints do not come from any 
statutes. Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hertzog argue that, 
even though the majority of the FTC’s enforcement activities 
end up being settled, corporations attach such high 
importance to the contents of these settlements, that one 
could even treat them as a new type of “common law.”156 
Nevertheless, in their own words: 
There is no federal law that directly protects the privacy of data 
collected and used by merchants such as Macy’s and Amazon.com. 
Nor is there a federal law focused on many of the forms of data 
collection in use by companies such as Facebook and Google.157 
The internal logic of the “notice and choice” model is 
individual-focused and market-based. Ultimately, users’ 
acceptance of the privacy policies is being equated with their 
agreement to the practices foreseen, and this agreement is 
treated as a sufficient legal basis for norm-creation. This 
model ignores the potential of externalities, disregards 
collective interests, and posits the market as a superior tool 
to politics for social ordering. At the same time, when forging 
this regime, its creators referred to the 1973 Report and, 
allegedly, were inspired by it.158 The context of this model’s 
origin is crucial for understanding its logic, and the source of 
its shortcomings. 
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1. The Emergence of “Notice and Choice”: the 1990s and 
the (Neo-)Liberal Fever 
A sympathetic reading of the history of “notice and 
choice” would try to explain its emergence through a genuine 
belief of its forgers that the economic freedom leads to other 
freedoms, competition generally works well, and so markets 
are the most favorable means for deciding the data 
management rules. A cynical reading, on the other hand, 
would be that the “notice and choice” model was essentially 
invented by the lobbyists of the marketing companies and 
tolerated by the Government, which saw an opportunity for 
creating a privately run surveillance system, useful 
especially in the aftermath of 2001. The correct 
interpretation does not necessarily lie in the middle, but 
almost certainly lies between these two positions.  
“Notice and choice” was born in the 1990s, continuing the 
sectoral trend in American privacy regulation. When the 
Internet went public in 1995, both its potential for commerce 
and for abuse was quickly recognized. In June 1996 the FTC 
Staff held a “Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the 
Global Information Infrastructure,” and in December 
published a report summarizing the proceedings.159 The 
document opens with a characterization of “limitless 
opportunities” offered by the new, online marketplace.160 
According to the 1996 report’s authors, the benefits 
stemming from anyone’s ability to easily gather personal 
information online “are apparent, both for consumers and for 
industry”.161 Overall efficiency will rise because marketers 
will spend less money on reaching the potential clients, while 
 
 159. FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER 
PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (1996), https://www.ftc 
.gov/reports/staff-report-public-workshop-consumer-privacy-global-information-
infrastructure [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT]. 
 160. Id. ch. 1. 
 161. Id. 
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consumers will spend less time looking for the information 
that interests them.162 However, the authors continue: 
The proliferation of readily available personal information . . . could 
jeopardize personal privacy and facilitate fraud and deception. 
These risks may make consumers reluctant to use the Internet or 
participate in online transactions and therefore could prevent 
consumers from obtaining the benefits promised by online 
commerce.163 
Note the subtle move from privacy intrusions and 
deception being legitimate concerns on their own terms, to 
being problematic as potential barriers/deterrents in access 
to the market. Consumers’ primary source of benefits is 
participation in the marketplace, and so circumstances 
preventing them from participation should be taken care of. 
Within this setting, the Workshop participants sought to find 
the appropriate response. Acknowledging that some cases, 
particularly health data, financial data,164 and data about 
children,165 might require specialized responses, the overall 
tone of the report seemed much more favorable to “soft 
solutions” like education and business self-regulation than 
legislative intervention.166 This document, publicly available 
but still internal, shaped what would follow in the year to 
come. 
In 1998 the FTC submitted its official report, titled 
“Privacy Online,”167 to Congress. Reiterating the belief that 
internet is “an exciting new marketplace for consumers,”168 
the FTC observed that “there are also indications that 
consumers are wary of participating in it because of concerns 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. ch. 2. 
 165. Id. ch. 4. 
 166. Id. ch. 3. 
 167. 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 158. 
 168. Id. at i. 
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about how their personal information is used.”169 Having 
considered both, the FTC stated that, in its view, the proper 
way to proceed is “to encourage and facilitate effective self- 
regulation as the preferred approach to protecting consumer 
privacy online.”170 The 1998 Report contained its own, 
morphed set of “Fair Information Practice Principles.” 
Referring to the 1973 Report (which the 1998 Report labels 
“seminal”) and several international documents, including 
the 1980 OECD guidelines and the 1995 EU Directive, the 






Although they are clear and relatable, these principles 
look little like those expressed in their alleged source, the 
1973 Report. On the one hand, this re-formulation must be 
applauded for its concise and succinct communication of the 
1973 Report’s plea for public notice, for facilitating data 
subjects’ rights to access and correct the data, and for 
ensuring security and proper enforcement of the normative 
frameworks governing processing. On the other, several key 
aspects are missing. 
The 1998 FTC Report does not mention the social aspects 
of data management at all. Among the threats, it sees 
privacy and deception as potential barriers to the market; 
but does not speak about the “coercive potential” so strongly 
underlined by the authors of the 1973 Report. Apart from 
direct negative effects stemming from unwanted disclosure 
of personal information, or failures of the systems to be 
secure, the Report sees no policy-decisions to be taken 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at i–ii. 
 171. Id. at 7–11. 
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regarding the tradeoffs between more efficient markets and 
the rising power of private organizations to predict and 
influence the behavior of individuals. As a result, the 
recommendations it makes differ from those expressed in the 
1973 Report not only regarding the perceived superiority of 
self-regulation over legislation (i.e. the form of intervention), 
but also the substance. The 1998 Report does not see a place 
for the “purpose limitation principle,” i.e. the rule according 
to which data gathered for one purpose should not be used 
for other purposes. With the exception of data about children, 
to which the 1998 Report attaches special attention,172 the 
view of the potential risks and necessary responses has been 
much more relaxed than in 1973. 
The legal response on the side of the Government closely 
mirrored these views. Several statutes, regarding the areas 
identified as sensitive, were passed, including the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,173 the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998174 and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.175 For the rest of the 
internet-driven data collection practices, self-regulation, to 
be enforced by the FTC, has been chosen as the preferred 
approach. As a result, a one-size-fits-all, market-grounded 
and individual-centered approach has become the paradigm 
of the American data management law. 
One thing is perplexing. How was it possible that in the 
1970s, the emergence of huge, bulky and expensive 
computers used in private and public organization gave rise 
to worries about individual freedom and necessary political 
choices; while in the 1990s the emergence of a global network 
connecting personal computers in everyone’s homes to these 
 
 172. Id. at 4, 12–13.  
 173. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 174. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 106-170 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012)). 
 175. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2012)). 
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organizations’ databases did not? Why, when the potential 
for abuse got higher, did the political response become more 
relaxed? Four possible reasons, not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, come to one’s mind. 
First, the geopolitical context has changed dramatically. 
1973 was the middle of the Cold War, with nuclear 
proliferation, Space Race, and proxy wars around the globe 
giving people a general sense of worry. In the 1990s, the 
overall climate in the West was triumphant. With the defeat 
of communism, a capitalist liberal democracy in a globalizing 
world seemed not only the inevitable, but also the best 
political-economic choice.176 This triumphant liberalism has 
been particularly strong regarding the internet, with legal 
articles expressing doubts about nation states’ ability to 
govern the “cyberspace”177 and activists expressing 
opposition to the desirability of doing that.178 Lawrence 
Lessig describes these societal feelings well in his Code 
2.0.179 Second, one could argue that in 1998 computers were 
 
 176. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 THE NAT’L INT. 3, 3–4 
(1989). 
 177. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 178. John Perry Barlow, Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 6, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-
independence. Barlow famously expressed the sentiment: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and 
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the 
future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome 
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. We have no elected 
government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no 
greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I 
declare the global social space we are building to be naturally 
independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no 
moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we 
have true reason to fear. 
 179. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 3 (2006). Professor Lessig writes:  
[I]n the spring of 1995, while teaching the law of cyberspace, I saw in my 
students these very same postcommunist thoughts about freedom and 
government. Even at Yale—not known for libertarian passions—the 
students seemed drunk with what James Boyle would later call the 
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no longer “new.” People got used to the idea, and nothing 
terrible had happened since the 1970s, so naturally, the 
worries were lower. Third, one could explain the change by 
corporate capture. Lobbyists sold the idea to the lawmakers. 
The 1998 Report is clear about their participation in the FTC 
Workshops.180 Marc Rotenberg, writing in 2001, argued:  
The traditional complement to “notice” had long been “consent,” and 
the problem that attracted privacy scholars and policymakers was 
to determine what would constitute adequate or meaningful 
consent. . . . The “notice and choice” formulation put forward by the 
Direct Marketing Association in 1996 provided an opportunity for 
the marketing industry to avoid resolving the difficult problem of 
what would constitute meaningful consent.181 
Seeing benefit in being allowed to collect and use 
personal data freely, without burdensome regulatory 
requirements, corporations, in particular marketing 
professionals, promoted not only the self-regulation as a 
means to realize the policy goals, but also the very 
philosophical foundation of market-centered individual 
freedom. As a result: 
Subtly, but powerfully and profoundly, the substitution of “notice 
and choice” for “notice and consent” transferred the protection of 
privacy from the legal realm, and from an emphasis on the 
articulation of rights and responsibilities, to the marketplace, 
where consumers would now be forced to pay for what the law could 
otherwise provide.182 
. . . . 
 
“libertarian gotcha”: no government could survive without the Internet’s 
riches, yet no government could control the life that went on there. Real-
space governments would become as pathetic as the last Communist 
regimes: It was the withering of the state that Marx had promised, jolted 
out of existence by trillions of gigabytes flashing across the ether of 
cyberspace. 
 180. See 1998 FTC REPORT, supra note 158, at i. 
 181. See Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 10. 
 182. Id. at 11. 
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One cannot escape the conclusion that privacy policy in the United 
States today reflects what industry is prepared to do rather than 
what the public wants done.183 
To be clear, not least because the lobbying has not been 
perfectly documented, establishing a causal link between 
particular events and the ultimate outcome is a very difficult 
task. On top of these considerations, one should also note the 
fourth possible reason, and that is a silent alliance of 
business and the US Government, where the latter saw an 
opportunity in creating a privately-owned surveillance 
technology. I do not want to argue for or against that, though 
I would mention that the NSA scandal showed that even if 
this was not already the Government’s intention back in the 
1990s, it clearly grasped that potential in the years to 
follow.184 
The overall ideology in which the “notice and choice” 
model has been forged was a market- and individual-
centered economic liberalism. As a result, the problem of 
data management by tech companies has been reduced to 
“consumer privacy,” and the solution to this problem was by 
definition going to concentrate on individual interests, best 
protected (in the view of the model’s creators) by the market. 
Furthermore, the “privacy” framing meant that law governs 
only the situations when an individual can be “personally 
identified,” and not those where she is anonymous, even if 
she can still be affected by data practices. These beliefs make 
up the ideological and legal foundation of the data analytics 
society in 2020. 
2. The Original Sin: A Market-Individual as the Sole 
Subject of Disclosure and Decisions 
There are three problems with constructing a data-
management law around an individual who is expected to 
 
 183. Id. at 34. 
 184. See Karina Rider, The Privacy Paradox: How Market Privacy Facilitates 
Government Surveillance, 21 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y, no. 10, 2018, at 1369, 1369 
(2018). 
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make decisions as a market actor. First, individuals’ 
understanding of “privacy policies” is necessarily limited. 
Second, even if individuals understood these documents, 
given the existence of social costs, they are not normatively 
competent to decide to impose these costs on other people. 
Third, individuals’ say about these matters should not be 
voiced as a part of a market transaction, where they might 
be in haste and have immediate interests at stake. 
The idea of a “privacy policy” in the “notice and choice” 
model is very different, even if seemingly connected, to the 
“public notice” requirement advocated by the 1973 Report. 
The addressee of the document is the consumer, not the 
public. And the function of the document became a norm-
creating one, not merely information-conferring. The authors 
of the 1973 Report imagined a world where public notices 
allowed the public to engage in political deliberations and, 
ultimately, legislation setting the limits on data collection 
and usage. However, the paradigm adopted in the late 1990s 
turned these “privacy policies” into contracts, ceding the 
norm-making to the individual market actors. 
Series of empirical studies now demonstrate that people 
do not read privacy policies,185 and even if they do, they do 
not understand them.186 Findings like these led Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider to call mandated disclosure “the 
most common and least successful regulatory technique in 
American law.”187 This has to do with the human condition, 
or what Daniel Solove calls structural and cognitive 
reasons,188 but also with the condition of the privacy policies 
 
 185. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer 
Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014); Obar & 
Oeldorf-Hirsch, supra note 20, at 129. 
 186. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches 
between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH.L.J. 39, 69 
(2015). 
 187. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 3 (2014).  
 188. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
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themselves. Not only is their form often difficult to 
comprehend, but also do not contain enough information to 
make an informed decision.189 However, even if one assumes 
that these problems could somehow be mitigated, the other 
two remain. 
Let us come back to the example of data-driven price 
discrimination. Imagine that I do fully understand that 
disclosing what my job is on Facebook will make it easier to 
infer what the wealth of other people is. Imagine I do 
understand that liking certain pages, or listening to 
particular music, makes it even easier to draw such links. 
Imagine that I even understand that as a result of my 
acceptance of Facebook’s privacy policy, some people will be 
shown higher prices of goods and services. Whether I 
consider this a good deal or bad deal is beside the point here; 
what matters is that I should not be given this choice in the 
first place. The same holds with regard to other social costs 
of data management: discrimination or behavioral effects. I 
should not be the one to make this decision, and especially 
not while looking for something online, and hastily 
“accepting” privacy policies.  
The limits for data collection and usage should be 
established in a political process and enshrined in 
regulation. The genetic code of the “notice and choice” model 
is contrary to these requirements. The “notice and choice” 
model essentially allows the companies to write the rules on 
these limits, put them in the consumer “contracts,” and 




Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881 (2013). 
 189. See GIUSEPPE CONTISSA ET AL., BEUC, CLAUDETTE MEETS GDPR: 
AUTOMATING THE EVALUATION OF PRIVACY POLICIES USING ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 3 (2018), https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-066_ 
claudette_meets_gdpr_report.pdf. 
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B. European Model: “Personal Data Protection” Approach 
In the meantime, our European colleagues have 
developed a very different approach to dealing with data 
management. The “personal data protection” model, 
currently expressed in the GDPR, is a general law applicable 
to all private and public organizations “processing”190 data 
about residents of the European Union.191 Unlike the “notice 
and choice model,” the GDPR does not see the relationship 
regarding data as a market transaction. Rather, it creates a 
range of administrative rules, governing any operation 
undertaken on personal data; rules identical for businesses 
and public authorities. These rules cannot be changed by 
contract, and their violation results in administrative fines 
imposed by specialized supervisory authorities.192 
 
 190. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 4, para. 2. The category is defined broadly:  
[A]ny operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data 
or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction. 
 191. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 4, para. 1. “Personal data” is defined as follows:  
[A]ny information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(“data subject)”; an identifiable natural person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of 
that natural person. 
Hence, any operation regarding any data about a person who can be identified 
falls within the material scope of the Regulation. It governs processing activities 
of both private and public entities, id. art. 2, by firms incorporated in the EU or 
“not established in the Union, where the processing activities are related to: (a) 
the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment of the data 
subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union,” or “(b) the monitoring of 
their behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the Union.” Id. art. 3, 
para. 2. 
 192. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 83. 
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GDPR divides its regulatory framework into three 
substantive groups: general principles,193, data subjects’ 
rights194 and data controllers’ obligations.195 However, 
within the chapter on the subject’s rights, three substantial 
articles are devoted to the issue of “transparency,” being 
basically an obligation to engage in the public notice.196 If 
one, for analytical purposes, separates these three from other 
rights, and at the same time treats the data controller’s 
obligations as correlated with subjects’ rights,197 one will see 
the familiar triad of (i) general principles; (ii) public notice; 
and (iii) subjects’ rights, exactly as advocated by the 1973 
Report. However, one significant difference must be brought 
to the fore: the GDPR treats “data protection” and “privacy” 
as human rights. Among its three stated objectives, the 
Regulation lists: “[protection of] fundamental rights and 
freedoms of natural persons, in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data.”198 
This has significant consequences for the shape of the 
“personal data protection” model. The legal requirements for 
consent to be valid are much more rigid than those necessary 
for a “choice” in American law.199 Further, any individual 
interest violated through an operation undertaken on their 
 
 193. Id. ch. II. 
 194. Id. ch. III. 
 195. Id. ch. IV. 
 196. See Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Transparency under 
Regulation 2016/679 (Apr. 11, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article 
29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=622227. 
 197. Rights are correlated with duties. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717–19 
(1917). 
 198. GDPR, supra note 32, art. 1, para. 2. The other two stated objectives 
include “[laying] down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free movement 
of personal data” and facilitating “free movement of personal data within the 
Union.” Id. art. 1, para. 1. The last objective stems from the EU’s goal, 
establishing a common market.  
 199. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 7; cf. supra Section III.A. 
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personal data might be treated as a human rights violation. 
And human rights, unlike economic interests, cannot be a 
subject of “cost-benefit analysis,”200 either in regulation or in 
adjudication. They might be balanced against other human 
rights,201 but not against interests like economic efficiency or 
innovation. This, taken together with the EU’s “direct effect 
doctrine,”202 results in an extremely rigid governance 
framework, difficult to comply with by corporations 
collecting data as a part of their business model, as many of 
the tech companies do.203 
At the same time, this law is still focused on the 
individual, and frames her interests as a problem of 
“privacy,” just like the “notice and choice” model. This 
renders the GDPR blind to collective interests and 
completely toothless when data cannot be directly linked to 
an “identified or identifiable” person. Finally, GDPR also 
applies a one-size-fits-all, technocratic approach to decide 
what data practices are acceptable or not. The difference 
being that the technocracy here is the domain of human 
rights, not microeconomics. Either way, no space for political 
choices has been foreseen. To understand the internal logic 
of this system, let us take a look at historical and ideological 
conditions of its emergence.  
1. GDPR’s Genealogy: European Convention of Human 
Rights 
The first issue regarding the European approach to data 
management is that the laws under consideration are 
 
 200. For a contemporary restatement of the cost-benefit analysis theory, and 
its place in the functioning of the regulatory state, see CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-
BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2018). 
 201. For the theoretical treatment of the rights-balancing in law, see Robert 
Alexy, On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison, 16 RATIO JURIS 
433, 436, 439 (2003). 
 202. See FRANTZIOU, supra note 110. 
 203. Scholars have gone as far as to call the GDPR “incompatible” with the 
very idea of big data analytics. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the 
Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995, 1017 (2017). 
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explicitly not a part of consumer law. Even though the 
European Union has a robust system of consumer law in 
place, in some ways mirroring the American approach (rules 
against unfair and misleading commercial practices)204 and 
in some ways going further (rules against unfair contractual 
terms);205 these tools have not yet been put to work regarding 
consumer data. Consumer agencies (FTC’s counterparts) are 
separate entities from the Data Protection Authorities.206 In 
2017, two legal articles suggesting using consumer law tools 
to advance data protection goals have been welcomed as a 
new and refreshing view.207 How does one explain this 
surprising difference between the two systems? 
American “notice and choice” model came in to fill a 
normative void. In the 1990s there were no rules governing 
consumer data collection online, so something was needed. 
In Europe, however, there was no such void. In 1995, the year 
the Internet went public, the EU adopted the Data 
Protection Directive, GDPR’s predecessor, harmonizing 
many of the already existing national data protection 
laws.208 These national laws, in turn, were either enacted or 
sustained to meet Europe’s nation states’ obligations under 
international law, stemming from the Convention 108 of the 
Council of Europe. So, when the Americans were discussing 
what to do about internet-facilitated data collection, their 
 
 204. See Directive 2005/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices 
in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L149) 22. 
 205. One could, roughly, summarize them as a “legislatively enshrined 
unconscionability doctrine.” See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 
29. 
 206. These are called “Independent Supervisory Authorities” in the GDPR. 
GDPR, supra note 32, ch. VI. 
 207. See Natali Helberger et al., The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the 
Relationship Between EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 1427, 1429–31 (2017); Nico van Eijk et al., Unfair Commercial 
Practices: A Complementary Approach to Privacy Protection, 3 EUR. DATA 
PROTECTION L. REV. 325, 325 (2017). 
 208. See FUSTER, supra note 108, at 55–65. 
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European counterparts already had their own national data 
management laws, by having just adopted new, shiny, state-
of-the-art legislation to tackle the problem. These laws 
contained the same catalogs of principles, rights, and 
obligations as the GDPR does nowadays, and were applicable 
both to public and private actors. However, they were 
enacted within a human rights mindset. 
Council of Europe, the body which adopted the 
Convention 108, was established back in 1949, in the period 
directly following the atrocities of the Second World War and 
Nazism, and when the Cold War between democratic West 
and communist East was materializing.209 Among its various 
duties, it was tasked with the protection of human rights.210 
Most notably, in the early 1950s, it adopted the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),211 followed by a series 
of issue-specific international human rights treaties. Among 
its many provisions, the ECHR contains Article 8: “Right to 
respect for private and family life.” The article reads:  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right . . . .212 
For an American, this is a familiar language. The 
character of this provision could be, roughly, compared to the 
American Bill of Rights. Not in content, but in form. The 
story goes like this: we had some really bad experience with 
the government in the past, a big part of that bad experience 
was the government not respecting our privacy, and so now 
we put a constitutional constraint on the government to 
prevent it from doing so. 
 
 209. See BIRTE WASSENBERG, HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 9–12 (2013).  
 210. Id. 
 211. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
 212. Id. art. 8. 
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In 1981, when (automated) information processing was 
becoming widespread, human rights lawyers realized that a 
qualitatively new possibility for a state to intrude in the life 
of an individual emerged. Hence, the Council of Europe 
adopted the Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.213 It 
did so as a part of the Article 8 mandate. It read: 
Article 1: The purpose of this Convention is to secure . . . for every 
individual . . .  respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic 
processing of personal data relating to him (“data protection”).214 
What follows is a text extremely similar to the 1980 
OECD guidelines and quite faithful to the 1973 Report. This 
framing will make its way to the national laws of European 
countries. In 1995 national laws enacted to fulfill the 
obligations imposed by the Convention 108 were 
harmonized,215 and in 2000 the European Union enacted its 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights.216 In 2009, this Charter 
became a part of the EU’s primary law (functionally the 
European Union’s “Constitution”).217 Within it, one finds a 
new fundamental right to “protection of personal data,” 
expressed in addition to the right to privacy: 
 
 213. See Convention 108, supra note 75, art. 1. 
 214. Id. 
 215. “Harmonization of laws” is one regulatory strategy of the European 
Union, occurring through an adoption of a directive. Directives are not directly 
binding on individuals, but oblige the Member States to enact state-legislation 
achieving the desired effect. See KAREN DAVIES, UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN 
UNION LAW 56–62 (2019).  
 216. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 391 [hereinafter the EU Charter]. 
 217. This statement is not entirely accurate in technical jargon, but best 
manages to explain the role played by the primary law in the European Union. 
For the explanation of the technical and political issues at stake when invoking 
the term “constitution,” see JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
102–07 (2001). 
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1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data 
concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on 
the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other 
legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access 
to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the 
right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.218 
In 2016, with the right to protection of personal data 
enshrined in its “Constitution,” the EU unified its data 
protection law in the GPDR.219 This new law would be 
noticed internationally for several reasons. First, it applies 
extraterritorially, also to companies with a seat outside of 
the EU, if only they direct their goods and services at the EU 
residents, or monitor their behavior.220 Second, unlike its 
predecessors, the GDPR gives the Data Protection 
Authorities competence to fine violators up to 4% of their 
yearly revenue.221 Third, the GDPR introduces several 
innovations, potentially interesting for other reformers. 
Those include the (in)famous right to be forgotten,222 right to 
explanation,223 legislatively-mandated obligations to 
 
 218. The EU Charter, supra note 215, art. 8. 
 219. “Unification of laws” is another regulatory strategy of the European 
Union. It occurs through an adoption of a regulation which, unlike a directive, is 
directly binding on the individuals and does not require implementation by the 
Member States. Regulations, Directives, and other acts, EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020). 
 220. See GDPR supra note 32, art. 3, para. 2. 
 221. See id. art. 83. 
 222. See Rosen, supra note 88, at 88. 
 223. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 193 (2019). 
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introduce “privacy by design,”224 or the institution of a “data 
protection impact assessment.”225 
Substantively, however, the GDPR is not a revolution, 
but a subtle evolution of the system existing as binding, in 
one way or the other, since 1981. The framework of general 
principles, public notice mechanisms, subjects’ rights, and 
controllers’ obligations existed already in the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines and the Convention 108; and their contents, even 
though updated and made more rigid, very much resemble 
these documents. Documents which, in turn, can be traced 
back to the 1973 Report. However, even though faithful to 
some of the tasks it set forth, the European “personal data 
protection” model also forgot some of the most important 
insights of its intellectual predecessor. Just like the “notice 
and choice” regime, it ended up constructing a system 
focused on privacy (and data “protection”) and on individual 
interests. And just like its American counterpart, it employs 
technocratic means of decision-making in place of political 
ones. 
2. The Original Sin: Individualistic, Technocratic, 
Human-Rights Mindset 
Unlike the “notice and choice” model, the “personal data 
protection” approach did not give in to the corporate capture 
and retained several useful data management tools proposed 
by the 1973 Report. First, it established a set of general 
principles and processors’ obligations through legislation, 
taking certain questions away from the market. Second, it 
retained the separation of “fact-conferring” and “norm-
creating” functions of “privacy policies.” In the European 
legal frame, these documents are not contracts, but rather 
transparency mechanisms,226 playing a role similar to 
 
 224. See AURELIA TAMÒ-LARRIEUX, DESIGNING FOR PRIVACY AND ITS LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK: DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND DEFAULT FOR THE INTERNET OF 
THINGS 84–87 (2018). 
 225. GDPR supra note 32, art. 35. 
 226. See FREDERIK J. ZUIDERVEEN BORGESIUS, IMPROVING PRIVACY PROTECTION 
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“nutrition facts tables” on food packaging.227 In this sense, 
the GDPR does account for collective interests to a certain 
degree. Just as one cannot contract-out from traffic laws 
when entering a taxi, one cannot contract out from the 
prohibition to profile people’s political beliefs or religious 
convictions enshrined in the GDPR.228 Third, the internal 
structure of the system, visible in its very name (“general”) 
leaves space for further legislative interventions, tackling 
certain problems issue-by-issue. However, no such 
specialized laws have been enacted. 
Despite some good intuitions, the GDPR commits the 
same mistakes as the “notice and choice” model. It focuses on 
“privacy” and “data protection,” and does not apply when 
data is not-personal. Further, it concentrates on the 
individual interests and individuals’ “control over their 
personal data.” The notice that companies must engage in 
needs to be concrete and comprehensive,229 but ultimately 
should be phrased in “plain and intelligible language, easy to 
understand.”230 The disclosure rules belong to the chapter on 
subjects’ rights, further indicating that the individual, not 
the society, is the intended recipient of these documents. 
Finally, the GDPR also does not leave much space for 
political decisions, replacing the market approach with 
human rights, like the technocratic means of establishing 
rules. 
Probably the greatest omission of the European system 
is a lack of a political mechanism to further specify data 
 
IN THE AREA OF BEHAVIOURAL TARGETING 106–09 (2015). 
 227. If companies lie about their data practices, they will be fined. GDPR, 
supra note 32, art. 83. However, the mere fact that an individual “consents” to 
what the privacy policy stipulates does not yet mean that the company is allowed 
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GDPR, including purpose limitation, data minimization, etc. 
 228. One can consent to processing these types of data about oneself, but this 
consent does not allow the company to process this type of data about other 
people. See GDPR, supra note 32, art. 9. 
 229. See Article 29 Working Party, supra note 196, at 8–9. 
 230. Id. 
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management rules for particular sectors. The “purpose 
limitation principle” makes it unlawful to process data for 
reasons other than those stipulated, but the GDPR does not 
say anything about which purposes should be treated as 
lawful, and which not. The questions visible in the examples 
discussed in Part II: “can a company use data to price 
discriminate? to engage in behavior manipulation? to 
segment the society?” are not, and cannot, be answered by 
the GDPR’s frame. Other legal instruments should step in. 
However, no such rules have been enacted, and currently, no 
such rules are pondered in the EU. Pervasively, despite 
everything written about the differences of the American and 
the European approach, it is the “consent” of the data 
subject, given in the market conditions, that shapes the 
decisions on the acceptable limits to data management. This 
consent is much more difficult to obtain; the limits of what 
one can consent to are much stricter.231 However, ultimately, 
it will be the individual who decides to impose costs on 
others. And if a data practice is questioned in a court, the 
decision regarding its permissibility will be based either on 
the interpretation of technocratic procedures of the GDPR 
itself or on the general human rights provisions.  
To be clear, I do not want this criticism to sound as if I 
oppose human rights protections and human rights 
movements. On the contrary, I consider them to be some of 
the most important achievements of the 20th century legal 
systems. However, I oppose the idea that when it comes to 
Facebook’s or Google’s business models, human rights will be 
the ultimate answer to what should be allowed. Obviously, 
they might offer us a view on what are the boundaries that 
should not be crossed; but should not be used as the source 
 
 231. One should mention, among others, the prohibition of processing of the 
“special categories of data,” defined as “personal data revealing racial or ethnic 
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union 
membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose 
of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data 
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation.” See GDPR, supra 
note 32, art. 9. 
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of all normative arguments. What exactly to do with data 
collection enabling behavioral manipulation or societal 
segmentation are political decisions, and should be taken in 
a political manner. 
*** 
Having shown where the current legal regimes are 
lacking, what socio-technological aspects escape their reach, 
and how to historically explain the reasons for their 
insufficiency, I would now like to sketch a proposal on how to 
go about amending these legal frames. 
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IV. DATA MANAGEMENT LAW FOR THE 2020S 
In every jurisdiction, one can describe the contents of its 
data management law. If we ask the question: what are the 
rules governing the collection, analysis, and usage of data 
about people; we will always get an answer. The answer 
might be (and currently is): there are very few rules; most of 
the decision-making is left to the market. However, there is 
always some answer. In this sense, the novelty of the “data 
management law” approach lies not only in the new rules it 
calls for but also in the change of the mindset allowing one 
to grasp this feature of the data analytics society. Some rules 
always emerge, there is always someone to draft them. There 
is no escape. The question is: who will draft those rules, what 
form will they take, and whose interest will they protect? 
I argue that in the 2020s, we should focus our efforts on 
developing a data management law able to account for, and 
mitigate, the social costs of data analytics. Data-driven 
technologies, making our lives more efficient and more 
convenient, will continue to be developed. Entities 
developing them will continue to be profit-driven companies. 
Someone will have to pay the costs. The authors of the 1973 
report feared that those will be “some of our most 
disadvantaged citizens.”232 Empirical research, for example 
on data-driven discrimination, now shows this prediction 
was correct.233 Moreover, we are paying costs as a society as 
a whole. Some of these costs, we already see and begin to 
understand, as behavior manipulation in the political 
process.234 Some others, like social segmentation in the 
commercial communications we receive, can be discussed 
only speculatively, just as in 1973. These costs, unless we 
want to ban the technology as a whole,235 cannot be entirely 
 
 232. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at vi. 
 233. See Sweeney, supra note 6, at 33–34. 
 234. See Confessore, supra note 143. 
 235. Which, in itself, would generate enormous social costs.  
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wiped out. However, they can be channeled in a much more 
conscious manner than the current regimes, the American 
“notice and choice” and the European “personal data 
protection,” allow us to do. 
The policy recommendations of this Article could be 
summarized in three claims. First, we must go beyond 
“privacy” (or data “protection”) as the frame for 
conceptualizing social costs of data analytics, and replace it 
with a more inclusive “social costs of data management.” 
This is necessary both to account for interests other than 
individual privacy and to govern situations in which 
individuals remain anonymous from the point of view of the 
company targeting them. Second, we must account for 
collective interests on top of the individual ones. The society, 
not the individual, should be the addressee of disclosure 
about data practices; likewise, the society, not the individual, 
should have a say on the limits of these practices. The 
integrity of the political process, non-discrimination or public 
health, are not matters to be decided by the sum of individual 
preferences. Third, these decisions are political in nature, 
and so should be taken via a political process. Societal views 
might differ when people are asked about the desirable limits 
of behavior manipulation, or social segmentation, in the 
market situations and during elections. They might differ 
when the product offered on the market is clothes and when 
it is pharmaceuticals. And many interests will have to be 
balanced against one another. That is why we need to tackle 
the social costs of data management one by one, issue by 
issue; and tackle them in a political manner, on the public 
forum, and not only in the offices of the technocrats. 
Just like the authors of the 1973 Report, I would like to 
make clear that the policy recommendations outlined below 
are not meant to give us a final answer on any given data-
management issue. Nor can they guarantee that in the end, 
everyone’s interest will be accounted for and no one will have 
to bear any costs. However, the envisioned paradigm will 
guarantee that the decisions about these costs will be taken 
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by the polity, not the by the corporations alone, and that they 
will be made in a process that is as “open, informed, and 
fair”236 as possible. Let us now take a look at each of the three 
pillars of this new framework. 
A. Beyond “Privacy”: Social Costs of Data Management 
Privacy obviously matters, but achieving privacy will not 
shield us from other social costs of data management. 
Concentrating on privacy might make us overlook other 
interests put at stake by corporate data collection and usage. 
There are at least two reasons to replace the conceptual 
frame of “privacy”—currently employed by the “notice and 
choice” and “personal data management” regimes—with 
“social costs of data management.” 
First, when speaking about “privacy,” lawyers tend to 
conflate two distinct social phenomena: disclosure of data 
about individuals, and use of data about individuals. I argue 
that the term “privacy” should be used to speak about the 
former,237 while the latter should become the domain of “data 
management.” The authors of the 1973 report treated these 
issues jointly, following the writings of their time.238 
However, both for the sake of conceptual clarity and of 
effective policy-making, we should look at them separately. 
Consider two examples. Imagine that I enjoy listening to 
Dutch marching music on Spotify. For social reasons, I would 
prefer that my colleagues, who think this is silly, do not learn 
about it. At the same time, I welcome Spotify suggesting me 
similar music, for example, Belgian marches. Or, imagine 
that I share a photo of my face on Facebook, and accept that 
everyone can see it. I am fine with my friends “sharing” it, or 
Facebook “disclosing” it to all its users. At the same time, I 
do not want Facebook, or anybody else, to be able to use this 
 
 236. 1973 Report, supra note 33, at 43–44. 
 237. This is consistent with the traditional understanding of privacy torts. See 
supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra Section I.B. 
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photo to develop facial-recognition technologies, and 
certainly not to learn how to recognize my face. The mere fact 
that I do not want my data to be disclosed does not yet mean 
that I oppose using this data by a company, and the other 
way round. Referring to both issues with a single term 
“privacy” leads to conceptual confusion, and renders policy 
discussions less nuanced. 
Second, mechanisms of “privacy” and “personal data 
protection” laws are triggered only when dealing with 
“identified or identifiable” individuals.239 If a company knows 
(or could know) that it is collecting data about my friend Bob 
Smith, its actions fall within the obligations imposed by the 
“notice and choice” or “personal data protection” regimes. 
However, if the company takes proactive steps not to identify 
him, and only collects data about his behavior and 
demographics, they are not bound to respect privacy laws.240 
From the point of view of someone who wants to price-
discriminate, or show some ads only to people who belong to 
a certain social class, or to manipulate someone’s behavior in 
the economic or the political sphere, it really does not matter 
what is your name, or Social Security Number. All they need 
is to assign you some (random) identification, and analyze 
data about “someone” with that number, not you personally. 
From the “privacy” point of view, such a world would be 
wonderful. If all the personally identifiable information 
“stayed” at users’ devices, and only anonymized data was 
transferred, our wish for privacy would be fulfilled. However, 
from the point of view of the social costs of data management, 
this changes nothing. There will still exist data-driven 
discrimination, exclusion, addiction, and behavioral 
manipulation. 
 
 239. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 26, at 1817–18. 
 240. Scholars dispute whether perfect anonymization is practically feasible. I 
do not offer an argument for or against that claim. Rather, I show that even if it 
was, and privacy considerations were taken care of, the problem of social costs of 
data management would persist. 
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In the data analytics society, data-costs can be imposed 
on individuals and social groups, even when the data 
collected and analyzed is not private (individuals freely 
disclose it) and even if the individuals are anonymous from 
the point of view of the corporation using it. This is why, to 
counter the social costs of data management, we need to 
move beyond “privacy” and towards “data management law.” 
Within it, we must identify other individual and societal 
interests: decisional autonomy, paired with the integrity of 
economic and political processes; freedom from addiction, 
paired with public health considerations; non-
discrimination, paired with social justice and equality; and 
many more. Axiologically, those are not new problems, and 
the values at stake here belong to the foundations of a liberal, 
democratic society. However, the data-driven means of 
intrusion upon these interests, based on seamless data 
collection, inferred knowledge and automated decision-
making call for new legal responses. These responses must 
tackle the costs of data management but must occur outside 
of the frame of “privacy.” 
Two caveats are due. First, I am by no means claiming 
that “privacy is dead,” or “not important,” or that one should 
not protect it. On the contrary, I admire and support the 
work of privacy advocates, and believe that we should stand 
our ground regarding the privacy matters. However, as I 
demonstrated, the majority of interests at stake in the data 
analytics society are conceptually distinct from privacy and 
can be better tackled through other channels. Second, I am 
not claiming that theoretically speaking, these problems 
cannot be explained and accounted for using privacy 
language. Privacy is an intellectually rich field, full of fine-
tuned arguments, distinctions, and theories.241 If one really 
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wanted to, one probably could employ the mix of “information 
privacy” and “decisional privacy” theories to tell the story of 
the social costs of data management under that one label. 
However, as I have shown, the stakes are too high to sacrifice 
the possibility of managing all the costs at the altar of 
conceptual austerity. 
Once we are able to go beyond privacy when framing the 
problems associated with data management, we should 
concentrate on the second shortcoming of the “notice and 
choice” and “personal data protection” models. And this is 
focusing solely on the individual interests while remaining 
blind to collective ones, and to the overall systemic health.  
B. Beyond Individual Interests: “Societal Notice” and 
“Societal Choices” 
Current data management laws value individual 
interests higher than collective ones. In a way, they are 
created solely to protect individual interests. The American 
“notice and choice” model concentrates on the individual 
consumer expressing her market preferences, while the 
European “personal data protection” model exists to protect 
the human rights of an individual data subject. However, 
given the potential for externalities, and the fact that one 
person’s disclosure imposes data-driven costs on other 
people, individuals should not be the only decision-makers. 
Certain collective interests, or interests of certain minorities, 
can only be protected as a result of collective action. 
In both systems, an individual is the intended recipient 
of the disclosure (occurring through the “privacy policies”) 
and the ultimate decision-makers (acting through “choice” or 
“consent”). I argue that these two elements of the data 
management laws should be modified. 
Let us begin with disclosure. The 1973 Report called for 
legislatively mandated “public notice,” aimed at facilitating 
political deliberations. Forty-five years later, in a world in 
 
(2007). 
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which we failed to live up to the tasks set forth in the report, 
Shoshana Zuboff observed: “Surveillance capitalists know 
everything about us whereas their operations are designed 
to be unknowable to us.”242 Currently existing “privacy 
policies” not only are written in a language difficult to 
understand243 but often simply do not contain the 
information necessary to fully comprehend corporations’ 
operations.244 Usage of open-ended phrases like “including,” 
“among others”; conditional forms like “we might,” or vague 
terms like “business partners,” “research purposes” have 
been documented by researchers245 and criticized by 
experts.246 Hence, the reasons why so few people fully 
understand what companies do with personal data pertain 
not only to the limitations of humans 247 but also the fact that 
the information often simply is not there. To be fair to the 
companies, there are good legal reasons for vagueness. If a 
policy must be understandable to the individual, one cannot 
expect a company to produce a 100-page long document 
containing a comprehensive list of all the business partners, 
types of uses and categories of data. Arguably, the 
requirements of “comprehensiveness” and 
“comprehensibility” cannot be fully reconciled. 
For these reasons, data management law for the 2020s 
should change the recipient of disclosure from an individual 
consumer (or data subject) to the community as a whole.248 
We should require that companies collecting, analyzing, and 
using data disclose the identity of all the corporations that 
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they share data with (or receive data from), all types of data 
they analyze, and all uses to which they put it. For the 
disclosure to be meaningful, these “notices” should be 
absolutely concrete and comprehensive. We should forbid the 
usage of open-ended (“including . . .”) and conditional (“may”) 
phrases and require concrete examples and descriptions of 
all the general terms, like “personalized advertising” or 
“improving services.” What types of goals are pursued? What 
types of improvements envisioned? This should be concretely 
specified. Other transparency mechanisms could be 
introduced as well. For example, one could ponder the 
creation of a national registry of data brokers (which already 
exists on the state level in Vermont)249 and the national 
repository of data sales and licensing contracts (similar to 
the repository managed by the SEC).250 
One could argue against these types of disclosure 
obligations, claiming that they would generate “too much 
data to process.” If every company was supposed to 
concretely describe all their data practices, would these 
documents not end up being hundreds of pages long each? 
This is a legitimate, but an unfounded, worry. Yes, these 
documents could be extremely long. However, we need to 
remember that when the corporations encountered this 
problem, they developed new data analytics technologies. 
There is no reason for the public not to use similar tools. 
Researchers have shown that techniques like machine 
learning, including natural language processing, can be 
employed to empower civil society by increasing their data 
processing capacities.251 Just like Google or Facebook equip 
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their human employees with powerful data analytics 
technologies; activists, journalists, and public authorities 
could increase the factual capabilities of lawyers working for 
them with the usage of the same techniques.252 
This would also separate the fact-conferring function of 
“privacy notices” from the norm-creating one. Another 
objection one raises against increasing the requirements for 
concreteness and comprehensiveness of these documents has 
to do with corporations’ mixed incentives. If companies can 
only do what they state in the privacy policy, and the privacy 
policy must list all the business partners and all purposes of 
using data, etc., would that not stifle innovation, or 
incentivize companies who want to innovate not to disclose? 
This worry holds only within the current paradigm of “notice 
and choice,” where the “privacy policy” is, at the same time, 
a disclosure mechanism and the contract. However, under 
the data management law, these two would be separate. The 
norms governing what data uses are acceptable would be 
enshrined in legislation, and if the companies would like to 
conclude additional boilerplate contracts, these contracts 
would be different documents that the “public notices.” 
The purpose of these legislatively mandated disclosures 
would be to increase to social scrutiny of data practices and 
to enable political decisions about the necessary rules. 
Further, they would enable proper oversight and 
enforcement of these rules. These rules, in turn, should stem 
not from technocratic means like the operation of the 
markets, or human rights adjudication, but from political 
choices made by society. What would that look like? 
C. Beyond Technocracy: On the Necessity of Politics 
Data management aimed at minimizing and allocating 
social costs of personal data processing necessarily entails 
choices. The question is: who should take them, how should 
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they be taken, and based on what normative considerations. 
Having argued for transferring these choices from the 
individual to the collective sphere, I would now like to outline 
how this should occur in a sectorial, issue-by-issue basis; how 
the normative considerations should be political and not 
technocratic; and present some deliberative and regulatory 
strategies for the legal reformer. 
1. Against One-Size-Fits-All, and for Sectorial Solutions 
The authors of the 1973 Report argued against one, 
overarching system of managing all social costs of data 
analytics, writing: 
The number and variety of institutions using automated personal 
data systems is enormous. Systems themselves vary greatly in 
purpose, complexity, scope of application, and administrative 
context.253 
However, both the “notice and choice” and the “personal 
data protection” regimes ended up instituting one-size-fits-
all solutions. Even if American privacy law can be called 
“sectoral,” the “notice and choice model” is, in itself, a one-
size-fits-all regime. Every instance of data collection, 
analysis, and usage occurring in the online commercial 
context is governed by corporate self-regulation and market 
transactions. It does not matter whether the question 
concerns using my shopping history to show me 
recommendations of other products, using information about 
me to infer knowledge about others, or using that inferred 
knowledge to price discriminate or manipulate their 
behavior. The decision always occurs in the form of a 
boilerplate contract. Similarly, the European “personal data 
protection” regime applies exactly the same set of principles, 
rights, and obligations to all situations. A pizzeria keeping 
my phone number to text me promo codes, and online 
advertisers trying to convince people to vote “yes” in Brexit 
referendum based on data I have disclosed, are governed by 
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the same law. As if the stakes were the same, and the societal 
choices identical. 
To address the social costs of data management, we 
should return to the approach suggested by the 1973 report, 
and practiced in the US until the late 1990s, i.e. sectoral 
legislation. In the data management law for the 2020s, we 
should remain faithful to the practice of addressing various 
types of data-driven costs one by one. Legislative 
deliberations regarding behavioral, targeted advertising; 
addictive design employed by social media, or price 
discrimination are long overdue. And the outcomes of these 
deliberations, both regarding the questions of whether to 
regulate, and how to regulate, need not, and should not, be 
always the same. A statute governing price discrimination in 
consumer products like clothes needs not to employ the same 
rules as a statute governing price discrimination in 
pharmaceuticals. The principles used in these laws need not 
be the same as the principles used to counter behavior 
manipulation in consumer markets. Which, in turn, need not 
be identical to those aimed at preventing behavior 
manipulation in the political sphere. Prevention of data-
driven social-media addiction can be achieved using different 
channels than non-discrimination in job advertisements. 
Note that in some spheres we might even accept the 
normative frames enshrined in the existing approaches. For 
example, when data analytics in criminal law are concerned, 
human rights is probably the correct standard to apply. 
Similarly, in some market conditions, where the potential for 
social costs is low, we might be fine with leaving some 
decisions to the market. However, none of these two should 
be the single standard aimed at solving all the problems; and 
the question what standard to employ where is, in essence, a 
political one. 
2. Bring the Questions to the Public Debate 
As a society we allow individuals to engage in activities 
that might impose costs on others. Sometimes, we are willing 
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to accept very high costs. In his seminal The Decision for 
Accidents, Guido Calabresi pointed out that we allow car 
traffic, despite the fact that, statistically speaking, we know 
how many Americans will lose life on the road this year.254 If 
we really believed that human life is priceless, we would 
simply outlaw cars, and accept the world with lower mobility 
and higher prices of goods. We are not willing to pay such a 
price. 
If this is the case with matters of life and death, one can 
easily assume that also in data analytics society, where 
autonomy, equal treatment and mental well-being of some 
individuals are at stake, we will choose to pay that price in 
exchange for the benefits of increased efficiency, new 
possibilities, and convenience. As of today, these “choices” 
are made by the markets in the US, and by human rights 
experts (at least in theory) in the EU. However, they should 
be up to debate. 
Consider price-discrimination. As explained in Part II, 
ubiquitous data-driven price discrimination can lead to 
increased efficiency, but also to social segmentation. The 
choice we face is not whether to allow it or prohibit it, but 
rather what social costs of allowing it are we willing to 
tolerate. Imagine, for example, that personalized price 
discrimination leads to a world where the consumers earning 
three-digit salaries have to, on average, pay 50% more for the 
plane tickets than those earning less than 60,000. Whether 
this should be acceptable or not is a policy decision that we 
should take as a society; not a random effect of allowing, or 
applying a general prohibition on, analyzing shopping-
history data. We might be willing to accept price 
discrimination if it traces wealth, or when it traces 
preferences,255 but oppose it when leading to social 
segmentation, even if the price is lower efficiency. 
 
 254. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault 
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965). 
 255. See Bar-Gill, supra note 3. 
2020] DATA MANAGEMENT LAW 637 
Or think about targeted advertising. As a society, we 
might be willing to accept some level of data-driven behavior 
manipulation in some consumer markets, but oppose them 
in the political sphere. Or, we might be willing or accept it in 
the political sphere, provided that all sides have access to the 
same technology. Further, when issues like discrimination in 
ad-delivery are concerned, we might want to prohibit it 
altogether or try to come up with some mitigating 
mechanisms. Instead, what we see today, is economists 
discussing what is more efficient, or human rights lawyers 
debating what respects human dignity, without giving much 
say to the people regarding the type of world they would like 
to live in. 
One caveat: I am not, by any means, arguing against the 
involvement of experts in the law-making process. 
Participation of people understanding the intricacies of 
technology, of the human mind, and of the functioning of the 
market, is necessary both at the problem-positing and 
solution-implementing stage. However, what I do argue 
against is leaving the normative choices, the political choices, 
to the experts only. It should not be the case that what is 
acceptable in Facebook’s or Google’s business model will be 
decided by an economist applying some theory of efficiency, 
or a human rights lawyers subscribing to some theory of 
privacy. Those are choices to be left to the people. This is the 
last “latent effect” identified by the authors of the 1973 
report: “questions of record-keeping practice which involve 
issues of social policy are sometimes treated as if they were 
nothing more than questions of efficient technique.”256 It is 
time to re-gain them for politics. 
How exactly should we do it? Again, the answer will 
differ depending on the issue. Certain matters, like the 
integrity of the political process or non-discrimination, could 
and should be fought for, and discussed, by various civil 
society groups representing the interests of the people. Other 
 
 256. 1973 REPORT, supra note 33, at 23. 
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matters, like whether to allow business models where the 
service is “free,” but comes with a cost of data collection and 
usage, should be expressly posed to the people. Become a part 
of the political process. Part of the political candidates’ 
platforms. Let us see what is it that people want. As of today, 
the market gives us just the illusion of choice. 
3. Direct and Indirect Data Management Law 
The last observation I would like to share pertains to the 
object of potential regulatory intervention. Data 
management laws can govern either data-practices 
themselves, like collection, analysis, sharing and usage of 
personal data; or the data-driven practices themselves, like 
behavioral advertising, price discrimination or online service 
provisions. There is a dialectical relationship between the 
two, where putting limits on data practices can tame the 
social costs of other practices; while regulating these 
practices can minimize the collection of data in the first 
place. Consider two examples. 
First, one could imagine legislation largely limiting the 
possibility of price-discrimination online. For example, it 
could contain a straightforward prohibition of charging 
different consumers different prices. Such a law would not 
address the practices of data collection and usage explicitly 
but minimize the incentive to collect and analyze data by 
some companies. If the effects cannot be used to price 
discriminate, why bother to collect and analyze data in the 
first place. 
On the other hand, it is possible to address the problem 
of data usage and collection to tackle social costs directly. For 
example, there could be norm prohibiting using data on 
consumer behavior to target political communications. As a 
result, even without passing a law on limits of political 
speech, an intervention aimed at data practices would bring 
about changes in the creation and distribution of social costs. 
Whether to employ one way of intervening or the other, 
again, is a matter for political choice.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Article argued for a new way of thinking about the 
negative effects of data analytics: data management law. 
Instead of concentrating solely on privacy (or data 
“protection”) I suggested we should adopt a more inclusive 
category of “social costs of data management.” Instead of 
focusing on individual interest only, we should account for 
the collective ones as well. And instead of employing one-
size-fits-all technocratic solutions, like markets or human 
rights, we should adopt a more nuanced, issue-by-issue, 
political approach to setting the limits on data practices. 
Human rights might delineate the boundaries of what we can 
allow, but a huge space for political deliberation remains 
within those boundaries. The question: what society do we 
want to live in? can be answered in numerous, equally 
legitimate, ways. Markets might be a useful tool for 
achieving some of our goals, but they should function within 
politically agreed upon legal frames. 
The history of the “notice and choice” and “personal data 
protection” approaches teaches us several valuable lessons. 
The problems we face today are not new. Already in 1973, 
the authors of the HEW Report foresaw the world 
characterized by the easy access to data about people; 
corporate ability to use this data for many purposes, 
including to influence human behavior; and the risk of 
imposing the costs of data-driven practices on the most 
vulnerable members of the society. The development of the 
legal response to these threats in the United States has been 
halted by the liberal euphoria of the 1990s, while its 
European counterpart has been overshadowed by the human 
rights mindset of “data protection.” However, at the dawn of 
the 2020s, we see how the markets neither accounted for, nor 
properly distributed, the social costs of data management. 
We see how human rights cannot be the only normative 
criterion in debating the limits of data management. We 
must see that it is time to move on. 
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Whatever the path we ultimately take, three 
observations will remain true. First, in the data analytics 
society, a person disclosing personal information imposes 
costs on other people, by enabling companies to infer new 
knowledge about others. Second, these costs can be imposed 
on people without personally identifying them, thus without 
violating their “privacy.” This is how technology functions 
and can function. The question is whether this should be 
permissible. Which leads me to the final observation: there 
is always a political decision taken. Regardless of whether it 
occurs explicitly through legislation, or implicitly, by leaving 
the decision to the market, and allowing corporations to 
write their own rules, some decision occurs. We know what 
the rules written by the corporations are. Hence, it is up to 
us to decide. Will the substance of the data management law 
result from our political action, or our failure to act? 
